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Abstract
Games in Energy Markets
Xuwei Yang
We study energy markets in game theoretic framework. The energy markets
consist of two types of energy producers: exhaustible producer and renewable pro-
ducer. An exhaustible producer produces energy with exhaustible resources, such
as oil. The resource reserves of each exhaustible producer diminish due to pro-
duction, and also get replenished with costly effort to explore for new resources.
This exploration activity is modeled through a controlled point process that leads
to stochastic increments to reserves level. A renewable producer uses renewable
resources, such as solar power, to produce energy. The renewable resources are
infinite, but costly in production. Each producer chooses optimal controls of pro-
duction quantity and exploration effort (exhaustible producers only), in order to
maximize individual profit that equals his quantity of production multiplied by
market price, minus costs of production and exploration. The producers interact
with each other through the energy price that is a function of aggregate produc-
tion, as one’s profit does not only depend on his own production quantity, but
also depends on the total quantity of all other producers. We aim to study the
equilibrium total production and price.
x
In Chapter 2 we study the game between an exhaustible producer and a renew-
able producer under stochastic demand that switches between different regimes.
We study how the regime changes and the relative cost of production, which is a
proxy for market competitiveness, affect game equilibria, and compare with the
case of deterministic demand. A novel feature driven by stochasticity of demand
is that production may shut down during low demand to conserve reserves.
In Chapter 3 we study game with a continuum of homogeneous exhaustible
producers. Mean field game approach is employed to solve for an approximate
Markov Nash equilibrium of the game. We develop numerical schemes to solve
the resulting system of partial differential equations: a backward Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation for the game value function of a representative producer
and a forward transport equation for the distribution of the reserves levels among
all producers.
In Chapter 4 we study a time-stationary mean field game model, in which
the reserves level remains invariant due to the counteracting effects of production
and exploration. We also study the impact of uncertainty in the regime that the
exploration process becomes asymptotically deterministic, so that discovery of
new resources happens at high frequency with small amount of each discovery.
xi
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We study production and exploration of exhaustible resources for the purpose
of generating energy. Exhaustible resources, such as oil, coal, and ores have great
importance in the functioning of the whole economic system. Dwindling oil re-
serves and the resulting impact on energy supply and price is of fundamental
importance to the functioning of the whole economic system. Energy production
with the resources generates revenue but lowers remaining reserves for further
production. Exploration for new resources will likely lead to discoveries that add
to reserves for production, though exploration is costly and discoveries occur in
an uncertain way. In oil industry, for instance, exploration activities include re-
search and development of new drilling techniques, and putting human labors and
facilities into scanning geographic areas for new resources.
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Exploration is one of the main interests in the research. Mathematically we
use a point process to model the exploration. Jumps of the point process mark
the discovery times. The amount of each discovery can be random in general, but
we assume it is a constant positive quantity without loss of any generality. The
intensity of the point process is subject to the control of producers. More effort
input leads to higher frequency of new discoveries as well as higher exploration
costs.
Energy markets can be viewed as companies competing with each other in
energy production and exploration for new resources, for the purpose of profit
maximization. Each energy company is regarded as a producer. It is of great
interest to study the competition between the energy producers and the resulting
equilibrium prices and total supplies. Due to the competitive nature of energy
markets, game theory is a useful tool to study the outcome of the competition.
Game theory deals with strategical interactions among multiple decision makers,
who are also called game players in game theoretic language. Each player has
an objective function and chooses strategic variables to optimize the objective
function. The strategic variables are also called controls from the perspective of
optimization. The players interact with the others in the way that each one’s ob-
jective function involves the strategic variables of the others, thus one has to make
decision by taking into account the strategies of the others. Producers in energy
2
markets can be viewed as players competing with each other in order to maximize
profit. The strategic variables of players in the research are production quantity
and exploration effort. We work in a Cournot game framework in which players
choose quantities of energy production and receive profit based on a single market
price determined through aggregate supplies. In contrast to the Cournot game,
where the strategic variable is quantity of production, the other type is Bertrand
game, in which price is the strategic variable of the players. Harris, Howison, and
Sircar [31] studied Cournot model of exhaustible resources, while Ledvina and
Sircar [39] studied Bertrand model. The game we study is non-cooperative, since
producers make decisions independently without any cooperation.
The players competing with each other by choosing strategies of production
and exploration, in order to maximize expected profit. The game equilibrium
of our interest is Nash equilibrium, which is a set of all players’ strategies such
that no one can better off by unilaterally changing individual strategy. A single
player’s decision depends on the reserves levels of all players, thus the controls
take the feedback form. Moreover, the control variables are Markovian, that is,
the decisions are based on current reserves level that contains sufficient informa-
tion of the past. Since the players choose strategies from the admissible set of
Markov feedback controls, the game equilibrium we study is Markov feedback
Nash equilibrium.
3
Due to the game nature and stochasticity, the research is embedded in the
framework of stochastic differential game. Stochastic differential game is closely
related to stochastic control theory. Isaacs [35] is a good reference for introduc-
tory differential game. We mention [24] as a reference for stochastic control and
stochastic differential game. The basic formulation of stochastic control involves
a dynamic system driven by stochastic factors, whose state evolution can be influ-
enced by exercising controls. Associated with the system is an objective function
which depends on the state process and controls over either a finite or an infinite
time horizon. The main goal is to find the control that can achieve the optimal
(minimal or maximal) value of the objective function. The objective function un-
der the optimal control is called value function. Dynamic programming method
is employed to solve for optimal control, which equates the value function under
optimal control to the value realized in a local infinitesimal time interval under
optimal control plus the value function after that. By dynamic programming
method, we obtain a partial differential equation of the value function in terms of
time and state variables, which is formally called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB)
equation. Optimal control is linked to the value function through the HJB equa-
tion. thus we can solve for optimal control by solving the equation. In stochastic
differential games there are players associated with a stochastic dynamic system,
on which they can exercise controls. Each player has an objective function de-
4
pending on the state variable of the stochastic dynamic system and the controls.
All the players are interrelated in such a way that each player’s value function in-
volves other players’ state variable and controls as well as his own. The controls in
the game theoretic context are also called strategies. Each player has to consider
all the other players’ strategies while making his own strategy. Since the objective
function value each player achieves is though game, we call it game value func-
tion. We use dynamic programming method to solve for the equilibrium strategies.
Since each player’s game value function involves other players’ controls, we need
to freeze other players’ controls when we derive the partial differential equation for
one player. The system of partial differential equations of game value functions
is called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJB-I) equations. HJB-I equation is a
main tool we use to solve for Nash equilibrium strategies in the research.
The research is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we study Cournot game
between two producers of different resource types under stochastic demand. Par-
ticularly we study how stochastic demand affects the Nash equilibria of the game.
In Chapter 3, we employ mean field game approach to find approximate Markov
Nash equilibrium of Cournot game with a continuum of exhaustible producers.
Numerical schemes are developed to solve the resulting system of partial differen-
tial equations. In Chapter 4 we study a time-stationary mean field game model,
in which the reserves level remains invariant due to the counteracting effects of
5
production and exploration. We also study the effect of randomness of exploration
process on equilibrium production and reserves distribution.
In Chapter 2 we study a game model between two energy producers of dif-
ferent resources: producer 1 that extracts an exhaustible resource (oil) and has
to worry about diminishing reserves; and producer 2 that extracts a renewable
resource (green energy such as solar power) and therefore has infinite reserves.
Two stochastic state variables are considered: current reserves level of the ex-
haustible player 1 and demand level. Moreover, players have a total of three
controls, namely productions rates for players 1 and 2, as well as exploration ef-
fort for producer 1. The exhaustible reserves level follows piecewise deterministic
trajectories, smoothly decreasing due to production and experiencing constant-
size jumps upon new reserves discovery. These upward jumps of fixed size mimic
discrete discoveries of new oil fields or new oil recovery technologies that take
place abruptly. The demand level is modeled as a continuous-time Markov chain
that switches among different regimes to mimic business cycle fluctuations.
The two producers in Chapter 2 compete through a Cournot framework, in
which producers choose quantity of production and receive profit based on a single
market price determined through aggregate supply. Costs of the exhaustible player
are driven solely by the costly (convex) exploration effort; her production costs
are taken to be zero. On the contrary, the green producer has a positive marginal
6
cost of production but inexhaustible resources. These production costs of player
2 are a proxy for the amount of competition. They also reflect the present reality
of non-renewable energy production as being the cheaper incumbent against the
new renewable entrants. The Cournot framework is used because at the macro
level, energy is perfectly substitutable and so the two producers’ products are in
direct competition. Producers’ profits are equal to the quantities of production
multiplied by the market price, minus the cost of exploration (player 1) or produc-
tion (player 2). The game value functions of the two players are the discounted
cumulative expected profits starting with certain initial reserves level and demand
regimes.
The aim of Chapter 2 is to study the game between the exhaustible pro-
ducer and the green producer in terms of dynamic Nash equilibria, and partic-
ularly the impact of stochastic demand on the game equilibria. The model is
cast in continuous-time so as to allow use of the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs
methodology that reduces computational analysis to study of coupled systems of
differential equations. We use dynamic programming method to obtain a system
of HJB-I equations of the players’ game value functions. Those equations are first-
order nonlinear forward-delayed ordinary differential equations. The equations are
first-order due to the lack of diffusive stochastic factors such as Brownian motion.
The forward-delay term is due to the controlled point process that marks the mo-
7
ment of new discovery. Moreover since only a single agent has reserves, there is
just one continuous state-variable, effectively allowing us to deal only with ordi-
nary differential equations rather than partial differential equations. Particularly
the equilibrium production of the two players are piecewise-linear in the derivative
of game functions, which leads to piecewise-defined with free boundaries between
adjacent pieces. Towards the end of chapter 2 we also mention some extension of
the Cournot model by considering stochastic cost of renewable energy production.
In chapters 3 and 4, we study Cournot game with a continuum of homogeneous
exhaustible producers. Each producer has production quantity and exploration
effort as control variables. The single market price is determined by all produc-
ers’ total production. Both production and exploration are assumed to be costly.
Each player has game value function that equals to the discounted amount of
profit minus costs, where the profit and costs are realized under the equilibrium
strategies of all players. We aim to study equilibrium production quantities and
reserves distribution in energy markets with a large population of competing pro-
ducers. Particularly, we want to understand how exploration activities affect the
long-term market organization, and how the exploration uncertainty permeates
the solution.
According to the classical HJB-I method for an N -player game, each player
is associated with an HJB-I equaiton and thus the model involves a system of N
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partial differential equations which is intractable. We employ mean field game
approach to model energy markets with a continuum of exhaustible producers.
The mean field game model reduces the system of N partial differential equations
to a system of two doubly coupled partial differential equations: one is the HJB
equation of a representative player’s game value function; and the other is the
transport equation of all players’ reserve distribution. The market price, directly
related to the total production of all the producers, enters the game value function
of the representative producer as the mean field term. The representative player
chooses his optimal quantity of production and exploration effort depending on
all the other players strategies through the mean field term market price.
1.1 Games with Exhaustible Resources
It is worthwhile mentioning models of single-agent before considering games
with more than one agents. There is a long literature on optimal economic
behavior of a natural resource monopolist extracting non-renewable resources.
Hotelling [32] found that without discovery exhaustible resource price grows at
inter-temporal discount rate. Pindyck [44] studied a deterministic model of ex-
ploration for exhaustible resources. In the model exploration was assumed to be
incremental and represented as a deterministic reserve addition. It was shown
that the resulting resource shadow price, corresponding to the marginal value of
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additional reserves will firstly decrease and then increase as reserves run low. As
extensions to Pindyck [44] there is a series of works studying exploration. Arrow
et al. [2, 21, 30, 47] represented exploration, which is punctuated by large discov-
eries, as a point process. Pindyck [45] further studied a model in which the total
size of reserves is unknown. The dynamics was then described via a stochastic
differential equation with controlled volatility and drift. Dasgupta and Heal [19]
is a comprehensive reference for literature on exhaustible resources up through
the 1970s.
The first paper that rigorously treated a dynamic non-cooperative model for
exhaustible resource extraction was published by Harris, Howison, and Sircar [31].
They studied N -player continuous-time Cournot game in which firms choose pro-
duction quantities. The games were characterized by a system of nonlinear HJB
partial differential equations which were analytically and numerically hard to re-
solve. They also analyzed the problem when there is an alternative, but expensive,
technology (for example solar power for energy production). They illustrated the
two-player problem by numerical solutions, and discussed the impact of limited
oil reserves on production and oil prices in the case of two-player model.
Ludkovski and Sircar [40] studied a related model that allowed for stochastic
evolution of reserves by considering exploration that can lead to discovery of new
reserves. This analysis was motivated by the oil market where E&P (exploration
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and production) efforts total many billions of dollars a year. In that sense, while
oil is exhaustible, it is also replenishable since there is a difference between total
abstract reserves on Earth, and what is actually commercially “proven” and drives
production decisions. With exploration, players have two complementary choices
regarding running down existing reserves and expending effort in the hopes of
finding new reserves. In particular, players may never fully “leave” the game
since they can periodically resurrect themselves by ongoing discoveries. In [40],
they firstly treated the case of a monopolist who produces and may undertake
costly exploration to replenish his diminishing reserves. Then a stochastic game
between an exhaustible producer and a “green” producer was studied. The new
discoveries were modeled through a controlled jump process with intensity given by
exploration efforts. The game between the two players led to a study of systems of
non-linear first-order delay ordinary differential equations with implicit boundary
conditions. The delay term and implicit boundary conditions were due to the
nature of jumps in the model.
In my work [41] Dynamic Cournot Models for Production of Exhaustible Com-
modities under Stochastic Demand, which is the main content of Chapter 2, I
extended the work [40] by studying the effects of stochastic demand on the equi-
librium of the dynamic Cournot game between an exhaustible resources producer
and a renewable resources producer. The state variable is the reserves level of
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exhaustible resources, which decreases at a (controlled) production rate and in-
creases through a random process that has discrete increment at a controlled rate
(this process is formally called controlled point process). The market price is a
negative function of the aggregate production of the two producers. The game
function of exhaustible producer is the total discounted profit over infinite time
horizon that is determined by the total revenue(product of price and production)
minus the exploration cost. The game function of renewable producer is the total
revenue minus production cost. The game functions of the two players are coupled
through the market price which is a negative function of their total quantity of
production.
We considered stochastic demand as a simulation of macroeconomic volatility.
The exogenous stochastic demand factor is modeled through a continuous-time
Markov chain that switches between high and low regimes(it can be generalized to
a process such as an Itoˆ diffusion, but two-regime setting is sufficient to represent
the market demand ups-and-downs volatility). The Markov chain enters the linear
price function as a coefficient that moves the price between high and low regimes.
We studied how the demand regime changes affect game equilibria, and compared
with the case of deterministic demand in [40].
Due to demand regimes switching, each player is associated with one game
function in each regime, which leads to a total of four game functions for two
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players in two regimes. In infinite time horizon, the model is time stationary.
Thus the HJB-I partial differential equations become HJB-I ordinary differential
equation, with time-derivative term vanishing. Due to the random discrete in-
crement term in the dynamics of the state variable, the HJB-I equations involve
forward-delay terms and implicit boundary conditions. The optimal control of the
two players depends on the value function of the exhaustible producer, thus the
HJB-I ordinary differential equations of the exhaustible producer is autonomous
of those of the renewable producer. It is sufficient to analyze the HJB-I ordi-
nary differential of the exhaustible producer to obtain the equilibrium production
strategies of the two players.
The major challenge is that the function forms of the HJB-I ordinary dif-
ferential equations are piecewise-defined with free boundaries between each two
adjacent pieces. The free boundaries occur because the optimal controls of the two
players are piecewise linear in the derivative of the game function of exhaustible
producer. The interaction of the forward-delay term and the piecewise-defined
functional form of ordinary differential equation poses a challenge. To the best of
our knowledge, there is no reference about well-posedness of such equations. But
using numeric method we solve an approximation to the system of equations that
is guaranteed to be well-posed. To deal with the forward-delay term in the equa-
tions, we use an iterative scheme that starts without the delay term, and iteration
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goes on by taking the data from the last iteration to substitute the forward-delay
term. In each iteration, we use fourth-order Runge-Kutta scheme to solve for the
system of ordinary differential equations. This iterative scheme was proved to be
convergent both analytically and numerically, according to [40].
Due to stochastic demand, the game equilibria become more complicated than
the deterministic demand model in Ludkovski and Sircar [40]. A novel finding in
the research is a new possible game equilibrium due to the stochastic demand. In
the low regime, it is possible that the exhaustible production shuts down thus the
renewable producer monopolizes the market. Exhaustible production shuts down
for two reasons: one reason is the difference between high and low demand regimes
is large thus it is profitable to shut down production in low regime in order to
save reserves for production in high regime; the other reason is that the average
holding time in low regime is short enough thus extra profit made in high regime
can compensate the loss in low regime due to production shutdown. Production
shutdown also leads to extra mathematical difficulty, because in this situation the
derivative of game function zeros out, the ordinary differential equation in the low
regime degenerates into an algebraic equation. In computation we have to detect
when this happens, and then we need to switch to a new ordinary differential
equation derived from the algebraic equation.
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Since the stochastic demand is a simulation of macroeconomic volatility in
the research, it is interesting to study how the game equilibrium changes as the
frequency of regime switching changes. We use the asymptotic expansion of the
game functions in terms of the average holding times in the two regimes, and by
letting the average holding times in both the two regimes goes to zero we obtain
the ordinary differential equation for limiting game function, which is again a
piecewise-defined ordinary differential equation with forward-delay term and im-
plicit boundary condition. By numerically solving the ordinary differential equa-
tion we obtain the equilibrium production and exploration when market demand
volatility is high.
The single-agent and two-player models [40, 41] will be extended to a model
with a continuum of players [42], which is introduced in Chapters 3 and 4. We
employ mean field game approach to find approximate Nash equilibrium of the
game, which will be introduced in the following Section 1.2.
1.2 Mean Field Game Approach
The second part of the research studies energy market with a continuum of
producers. Mean field games (MFG) approach is applied to model the strate-
gic interactions among a continuum of players and the resulting equilibrium of
production, exploration, and distribution of resources reserves. In a differential
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game model with a finite number N of players, their equilibrium strategies can
be determined by a system of Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs (HJB-I) equations
derived from the dynamic programming principle. The dimension of the system
in general increases as the number N of players increases, which makes the game
model intractable for large N . Mean field game (MFG) approach simplifies the
modeling by considering equilibria with a continuum of homogenous players; the
respective finite dimensional game state translated into a measure η. The main
idea is to consider an optimization problem of the representative agent; the latter
becomes a regular stochastic control problem with the competitive effect captured
via a certain aggregate mean-field interaction driven by η. In turn, the aggregate
behavior of the players implies dynamics on the distribution η of agent states. This
leads to a system of two infinite-dimensional partial differential equations (PDEs)
which is viewed as an approximation to the N -system of finite-dimensional PDEs
in the original finite-N setup.
The MFG framework was introduced by Lasry and Lions [36, 37, 38] and
Caines, Huang, and Malhame [34]. A formal introduction to the basics of mean
field games and mean field type control can be found in Bensoussan, Frehse, and
Yam [3]. Cardaliaguet [6] studied a system of first order mean field game equations
with local coupling in the deterministic limit. A system of (possibly degenerate)
second order mean field game partial differential equations was analyzed in [7], and
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existence and uniqueness of suitably defined weak solutions were proved. Carmona
and Delarue [13] provided a probabilistic analysis of a large class of stochastic
differential games for which the interaction between the players is of mean-field
type, and proved that solution of mean field game indeed provides approximate
Nash equilibria for games with a large number of players. Bensoussan, Sun, Yam,
and Yung [4] provided a comprehensive study of a general class of linear-quadratic
mean field games. Mean field games between a major player and a continuum of
minor player can be found in [33, 43, 15]. Mean field game models with local
coupling can be found in [5, 6, 7]. Cardaliaguet, Lasry, Lions, and Porretta [8]
studied a locally coupled mean field game model defined on a finite time horizon
and showed that the system converges to a stationary mean field game as time
horizon tends to infinity. It was studied in [9] that a mean field game model
with nonlocal coupling on a finite time horizon converges exponentially to the
associated stationary mean field game model, a time horizon tends to infinity.
Achdou, Camilli, and Capuzzo-Dolcetta [1] introduced finite difference schemes
for stationary and evolutive mean field game models, and proved convergence
of the numerical schemes under various assumptions on the coupling operator.
Carlini [10, 11] proposed fully discrete semi-Lagrange schemes for mean field game
systems of first order and second order, and proved convergence of the numerical
schemes. In [29, 16, 17], iterative schemes were used to solve the coupled mean
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field game partial differential equations associated with dynamic Cournot models
for production of exhaustible resources.
The mathematical significance of the MFG approach is that it provides a tool
to study (differential) games with a large population of players. Specifically, the
MFG setup leads to an HJB equation to model a representative player’s strategy,
and a transport equation to model the evolution of the distribution of all the play-
ers’ states. In our context, the states are the reserves’ levels, and the interaction is
via the market price p that is related to total production across all the producers.
Thus, p enters the game value function of the representative producer as the mean
field term and drives his optimal quantity of production and exploration efforts
conditional on the other producers’ strategies. In turn, the distribution of reserves
is driven by the latter production rates and exploration efforts.
The study of exhaustible resources oligopolies using MFGs was initiated in
Gue´ant et al. [28, 29] who studied a mean field Cournot model with a linear-
quadratic production cost function, and a stochastically fluctuating reserves pro-
cess. They further introduced generalized models that consider value function
depending on further factors, e.g. they included a ranking effect into the value
function. They also considered competition between producers of two types of
resources. Graber [25] introduced a linear quadratic mean field game model of
exhaustible resource production, in which the reserves process of a representative
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player is influenced by a common noise with all other players, as well as its individ-
ual noise. [25] at the beginning studied a general linear quadratic mean field type
control problem by giving solution both in terms of a forward/backward system
of stochastic differential equations and by a pair of Riccati equations. [25] further
gave certain conditions so that the mean field type control problem is equivalent
to a class of mean field game problems. [25] then gave a model of exhaustible
resource production, and connected it to an equivalent linear quadratic mean
field type control problem. By solving the associated pair of Reccati equations,
equilibrium production and market price are obtained in explicit form.
Chan and Sircar [16, 17] showed that the mean-field equilibrium for production
of exhaustible resources is the same for both Bertrand and Cournot type compe-
tition. Cournot competitions between exhaustible and renewable resources were
studied in [17]. They first considered competition of producers, each of whom can
produce costly renewable resources once exhaustible reserves run out. Then they
studied competition of a large group of exhaustible producers with a single renew-
able producer, similar to the major-minor model of Huang [33]. It was found that
when renewable production cost is high, the exhaustible producers may strategi-
cally increase production rate and hence lower the price. They also studied the
impact of exploration and discovery in Cournot models of exhaustible resources
and found that higher reserves lower exploration rates and increase production.
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We apply the MFG approach to model energy markets with a continuum of
producers of exhaustible resources. Through the mean field formulation, we aim
to study equilibrium production quantities and reserves distribution in energy
markets with a large population of competing producers. Particularly, we want
to understand how exploration activities affect the long-term market organiza-
tion, and how the exploration uncertainty permeates the solution. Three main
quantities that we wish to investigate are: (i) the price effect of exploration, and
related time-evolution; (ii) aggregate production implied by the model; (iii) ag-
gregate exploration efforts. The related analysis yields quantitative insights into
the macro behavior of major commodity markets, especially those for fossil fuels
(crude oil, natural gas) where exhaustibility and associated E&P (Exploration
and Production) activities are key to strategic behavior of the firms.
In comparison to previous studies and MFG models, our setup has several key
differences. First, the price interaction coming from the aggregate production rate
yields a non-standard mean-field coupling between the agent controls (rather than
the more common state-space interaction), necessitating special treatment in the
HJB equation. Second, the jump process modeling discrete reserves discoveries
leads to a integral term in the HJB equation and a non-local term in the transport
equation. Third, the hard constraint of exhaustibility (i.e. zero reserves) generates
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a non-standard, implicit boundary condition at x = 0 which again requires a
tailored solution.
Our work fits into two different strands of game-theoretic models of energy
production. On the one hand, we extend the works [16, 29] who considered ex-
haustible resources but without exploration; thus reserves were non-increasing.
Specifically, the reserves processes in [29, 16] are modeled by Itoˆ diffusion pro-
cesses, and the transport equation of reserves distribution is determined by a
standard Kolmogorov forward equation. In contra-distinction, in this chapter
we consider exploration activities that stochastically lead to additional reserves.
Thus, the reserves process is a controlled jump process generating a non-local,
first-order transport equation. On the other hand, we extend the duopoly model
[40]. In the latter model of an exhaustible producer and a renewable producer,
each one has significant power of influence on price; in the MFG model herein,
each producer has negligible power on market price that is rather driven by the
aggregate production.
The closest work to ours is Chan and Sircar [17] who also considered an MFG
setting with exploration. We give a more comprehensive investigation of explo-
ration effects on game equilibrium in terms of total production, reserves distribu-
tion, and producers’ behavior in limiting situations of exploration and discovery.
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The above features generate several major challenges. For example, due to the
jump process, the transport equation of the reserves distribution in our research
is a partial integro-differential equation which leads to some more analytical and
numerical difficulty. A major part of the paper is devoted to constructing an
iterative numerical scheme to solve the MFG equations. Our numerical scheme
decouples the HJB and transport equations via a Picard-like iteration that alter-
nately updates the optimal production and exploration controls, and the reserves
distribution function (which in turn determines the market price). Furthermore,
since the HJB equation depends on time and space, we use method of lines to
solve the HJB equation, that is, we discretize the HJB equation in the space di-
mension but not in time and solve the system of ordinary differential equations
using fourth-order Runge Kutta method.
1.3 Model
1.3.1 Reserves Process
We consider a game model with N exhaustible producers (players). Each
producer uses exhaustible resources, such as oil, to produce energy. Let X it rep-
resents the reserves level of player i, i = 1, ..., N . Each X it belongs to the state
space of nonnegative real numbers R+
⋃{0}. Reserves level X it decreases at a
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controlled production rate qit ≥ 0, and increases by jumps due to discovery of new
resources. We use a controlled point process to model occurrences of new discov-
eries. Specifically, occurrences of new discoveries for player i are modeled through
a point process N it with controlled intensity λ(t)a
i
t, where a
i
t is the exploration
efforts controlled by the player and λ(t) is rate of discoveries per unit exploration
effort. The parameter λ(t) reflects the current exploration techniques and overall
resources underground, hence it is taken as externally given and uniform for all
producers. Since the total resources underground is decreasing due to exploration
and production, it is reasonable to assume that λ(t) is decreasing in time and
lim
t→∞
λ(t) = 0.
Let τ in be the n-th arrival time of the point process N
i
t , then the inter-arrival
time between the n-th and (n + 1)-th arrivals satisfies the following probability
distribution
P
(
τ in+1 > τ
i
n + t
)
= exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λ(s)aiτ in+sds
)
. (1.1)
The positive quantity δ is the unit amount of a discovery, which is assumed to be
constant as in [40, 41]. The unit amount δ of each discovery can be random in
general, which we will address in the context of specific optimization problems.
These upward jumps of fixed size δ mimic discrete discoveries of new oil fields (or
perhaps new oil recovery technologies) that take place abruptly. Such “Poisso-
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nian” dynamics date back to work of Arrow and Chang [2] and are arguably more
fidel to realistic reserves evolution. According to the setups above, the reserves
dynamics of the players are given by the following stochastic differential equations
dX it = −qit1{Xit>0}dt+ δdN it , t > 0, (1.2)
X i0 = x
i
0 ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ..., N.
where each player i is assumed to have initial reserves level xi0, i = 1, 2, ..., N . The
indicator function 1{Xit>0} implies that production shuts down whenever reserves
run out, i.e., X it = 0. The N players’ reserves can be represented by a random
vector defined as
XNt :=
(
X1t , · · · , XNt
)
.
The controlled dynamics (1.2) of the reserves can be described as piecewise deter-
ministic process (PDP), because between discoveries no new information is coming
in and reserves decrease continuously according to the production schedule. At
discovery moments, reserves increase via an instantaneous jump of size δ.
1.3.2 Cost Functions
We assume that all producers have the same cost functions of production and
exploration, denoted by Cq(·) and Ca(·), respectively,
Cq(q) = κ1q + β1
q2
2
, Ca(a) = κ2a+ β2
a2
2
. (1.3)
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The coefficients β1,2 of the quadratic terms are assumed to be positive, which make
the cost functions strictly convex for q and a large enough. Convexity of the cost
functions guarantees that the optimal production and exploration effort levels
are finite. The coefficients κ1,2 of the linear terms represent constant marginal
cost of production and exploration arisen from the use of facilities and labor.
The coefficients β1,2 of the quadratic terms represent increasing marginal cost
proportional to quantities of production and exploration efforts. Production and
exploration of exhaustible resources lead to negative externalities (such as rising
labor costs or nonlinear taxation). We note that when κ2 = 0 then exploration is
ongoing, otherwise a∗ = 0 could be optimal.
1.3.3 Price Determination
The market price p is determined from the global supply-demand equilibrium.
The total demand is determined through a demand function p → D(p) which
gives total demand levels at each price level p. The producers sell total quantities
Q into the market and receive price p determined through a price function p(Q).
In the global supply-demand equilibrium, the price function should be equal to
the inverse demand function D−1(Q), i.e. p(Q) = D−1(Q). We assume a linear
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price (or inverse demand) function
p = p(Q) = D¯ −Q, (1.4)
where Q :=
∑N
i=1 q
i is the total production of all N producers, and D¯ is the
maximum (finite) choke price under zero supply. Producers interact with each
other through this price mechanism that is driven by the aggregate supply (and
affects player’s profits) leading to non-cooperative game.
1.3.4 Game Value Functions and Strategies
In a continuous-time Cournot game model, each player chooses rate of pro-
duction qi in order to maximize profit which is equal to the revenue p · qi, minus
the production and exploration costs, integrated and discounted at a rate r > 0.
We work on a finite time horizon [0, T ], where T is exogenously specified. The
role of the horizon will be revisited in the sequel. The price each player receives
is determined through the inverse demand function (1.4).
We define the strategy profile s of all the N players by
s :=
(
s1, s2, ..., sN
)
,
with each player i’s strategy vector denoted by si := (qi, ai). Starting with initial
reserves state Xt = x, each player’s objective functional J i, i = 1, . . . , N on [t, T ]
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is defined as the total discounted profit
J i (s; t,x) := E
{∫ T
t
[
D−1
(
N∑
j=1
qjs
)
qis − Cq(qis)− Ca(ais)
]
e−r(s−t) ds
∣∣∣∣∣ Xt = x
}
,
(1.5)
where the expectation is over the random point processes N j that drive Xj and
hence qj’s. Associated with the objective functional, we define player’s i best
response value function conditional on other players’ strategies {sj,∗}j 6=i as the
supremum
vi(t,x) := sup
si∈A
J i (s1,∗, . . . , si−1,∗, si, si+1,∗, . . . , sN,∗; t,x) , i = 1, . . . , N. (1.6)
We focus on the admissible set A of strategies whereby sit = (qit, ait) are Markovian
feedback controls qit = q
i(t,Xt), a
i
t = a
i(t,Xt) such that J i(s; t,x) <∞, ∀x ∈ RN+ ,
for all i = 1, . . . , N . The exhaustibility constraint also imposes that qi(t, 0) ≡ 0
is the only admissible control.
From (1.5) and (1.6), we see that each player’s choice of strategy depends on
the strategies of all the others. We aim to study the Nash equilibrium of this game.
To be more precise, we look for Markov feedback Nash equilibrium, because the
strategies set from which the players choose is of Markov feedback form.
Definition 1.1 (Nash equilibrium of N -player game). The Nash equilibrium of
N-player game is a strategy profile s∗ =
(
s1,∗, . . . , sN,∗
)
of the N players with each
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si,∗ = (qi,∗, ai,∗) such that
J i (s∗; t,x) ≥ J i ((s∗,−i, si); t,x) , ∀i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (1.7)
where s∗,−i is the strategy profile s∗ with the i-th entry si,∗ replaced by arbitrary
si = (qi, ai) ∈ A.
In words, a Nash equilibrium is the set of strategies of the N players such that
no one can better off by unilaterally changing his own strategy. The feedback
structure of the controls qit = q
i (t,Xt), a
i
t = a
i (t,Xt) together with (1.4) imply
that player i’s dependence on Xt can be summarized by his individual reserves X
i
t
and the aggregate distribution of all players’ reserves. The latter is characterized
through the upper-cumulative distribution function defined by
ηN(t, x) :=
1
N
N∑
j=1
1{Xjt≥x}. (1.8)
Thus the Markovian feedback controls (qi, ai) can be equivalently represented as
qit = q
i
(
t,X it ; η
N(t, ·)) , ait = ai (t,X it ; ηN(t, ·)) , i = 1, . . . , N. (1.9)
Theoretically the Nash equilibrium of the N -player game can be found by
Hamilton-Jacobi-Isaacs (HJB-I) approach. HJB-I approach is to use dynamic
programming principle to derive the partial differential equation of each player’s
game value function, with other players’ strategies as entries. It is extremely hard
to find a Nash equilibrium by using the (HJB-I) approach either analytically or
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numerically, even for small N , e.g. N = 2. In Chapter 2 we study the Cournot
game between an exhaustible producer and a renewable producer in high and
low demand regimes, which involves a system of equations with dimensionality
equal to two (number of players) by two (number of demand regimes). The re-
newable producer has infinite resources, but has positive fixed production costs.
The production strategy of the renewable producer depends on the production
of the exhaustible producer. Only the exhaustible producer has controls on the
reserves level as the unique state variable. Hence the equations of the exhaustible
producer are autonomous from the equations of the renewable producer, and it
suffices to deal with the equations of the exhaustible producer to obtain the Nash
equilibrium of the game. Moreover, We consider the stationary case in which
exploration can go forever, thus we just need to deal with a system of ordinary
differential equations.
In Chapters 3 and 4, we employ mean filed game approach to find approximate
Nash equilibrium of Cournot game involving a continuum of players (N → ∞),
which reduces the system of N coupled equations in HJB-I framework to two
doubly coupled equations: one is the HJB equation of a representative player;
and the other is the equation of the evolution of distribution of all the players.
29
Chapter 2
Dynamic Cournot Game Under
Stochastic Demand
2.1 Model Overview
In this chapter we study dynamic Cournot games between two players: pro-
ducer 1 that extracts a non-renewable resource (oil) and has to worry about re-
serves; and producer 2 who extracts a renewable resource (green energy) and
therefore has infinite reserves. We also consider two stochastic state variables:
demand Dt and current reserves Xt of the exhaustible player 1. Moreover, agents
have a total of three controls, namely production rates for producers 1 and 2, as
well as exploration effort for producer 1.
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The two producers compete through a Cournot framework, in which producers
choose quantities of energy to produce and receive profit based on a single market
price determined through aggregate supply. Costs of the exhaustible player are
driven solely by the costly (convex) exploration efforts; her production costs are
taken to be zero. On the contrary, the green producer has a positive marginal
cost of production but inexhaustible resources so his additional shadow marginal
costs are zero. These production costs of player 2 are a proxy for the amount
of competition. They also reflect the present reality of non-renewable energy
production as being the cheaper incumbent against the new renewable entrants.
The Cournot framework is used because at the macro level, energy is perfectly
substitutable and so the two producer’s products are in direct competition.
Our aim is to study this duopoly of the exhaustible resources producer with
a green producer in terms of dynamic Nash eqilibria. The model is cast in
continuous-time so as to allow use of the well-understood Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-
Isaacs (HJB-I) methodology that reduces computational analysis to study of cou-
pled systems of differential equations. In order to simplify the mathematics as
much as possible while maintaining dynamic effects, we keep the dynamics of
(Dt) and (Xt) stylized, To this end, reserves (Xt) follow piecewise deterministic
trajectories, smoothly decreasing due to production and experiencing constant-
size jumps upon new reserves discovery.
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The demand level (Dt) is modeled as Dt = D(Mt) where Mt is a finite-state
Markov chain; this is meant to evoke the popular regime-switching models that are
frequently used in financial mathematics to model the business cycle fluctuations.
In the context of single-agent optimization, a related model of resource extraction
(with an exogenous discovery process) within a random environment was studied
in [22].
The main setting just takes Dt to have two possible levels L,H. The demand
level modulates the common price obtained by the producers for a fixed supply
level. In a toy setting this occurs linearly. Both state variables are modeled by
stationary processes, leading to an infinite-horizon discounted game. With the
Markovian dynamics, this allows to reduce equilibrium behavior to Markov feed-
back (closed-loop) strategies. A drawback is that agents are infinitely long-lived
(i.e. never leave or enter the game) and no off-equilibrium behavior is modeled.
The combination of the above choices keeps the overall state-space as simple
as possible and in particular makes the HJB-I equations first-order only, removing
many of the analytical difficulties arising in second-order equations (for example
[31] found that these equations can sometimes be hyperbolic rather than parabolic,
causing unstable analytic and numeric behavior). Moreover, since only a single
agent has reserves, there is just one continuous state-variable, effectively allowing
us to deal only with ordinary differential equations, rather than partial differential
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equations. We however stress that exploration necessarily introduces additional
subtleties; in our model it brings in a non-local term that requires careful treat-
ment even at the implementation level.
2.2 Dynamic Cournot game under stochastic de-
mand
Two players (named 1 and 2) produce perfectly substitutable goods at rates
q1, q2. The price p is determined by the price (inverse demand) function (1.4)
introduced in section 1.3.3 with total quantity of production Q = q1 + q2. In the
present chapter we consider the situation of stochastic demand, whereby market
demand exhibits exogenous fluctuations over time. All variables are thereafter
continuously indexed by t ∈ R+. We model stochastic demand by making D¯
non-constant, modulated by an exogenous factor (Mt), namely
pt ≡ p(q1, q2,Mt) = Mt − q1 − q2. (2.1)
We assume that (Mt) is a finite-state stationary Markov chain with state space
E and generator Λ ≡ (λij). Thus, a larger value of Mt means stronger demand and
therefore a higher price pt for the same level of supply. For illustrative purposes
we shall focus on the case where (Mt) is a two-state Markov chain with state
space {D0, D1} ≡ {L,H}, where 0 < L ≤ H. In that case we label the time-
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homogeneous switching rates between the two regimes of (Mt) as λ01 and λ10
respectively.
Player 1 extracts a non-renewable resource that may become exhausted. His
reserves at time t are denoted by Xt ≥ 0. Reserves decrease through production
but can be replenished via exploration. Without any reserves, the player may not
produce but may continue to search for replenishments. Denote by at ≥ 0 the
exploration effort at time t, and let (Nt) be a point process for counting discoveries
of new resources. Then (Nt) has controlled intensity λat, and the arrival times
τn’s of (Nt) satisfy (1.1). The unit amount of new discovery is a fixed δ > 0.
Overall, the reserve process (Xt) of player 1 follows the dynamics (1.2) for a
single producer i = 1, with q1t being the production rate. Exploration is costly
and generates costs at rate Ca(at) per unit time, where the cost function takes
the function form Ca(a) = κ2a+ β2
a2
2
given by (1.3).
Player 2 always has infinite resources, but faces positive fixed production costs
c ≥ 0. It is possible for the controls to be zero in which case there is no production
(reserves remain constant) or no exploration (i.e. discovery rate is zero).
Players aim to maximize their total discounted profit, which is equal to the
instantaneous revenue pt · qt, minus the production and exploration costs, inte-
grated and discounted (using continuous discount rate r > 0) on the infinite time
horizon.
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To analyze the game equilibria we use the notion of Markov Nash equilib-
ria. Thus, player strategies are assumed to be in closed-loop feedback form, q`t =
q`(Xt,Mt), ` = 1, 2 and at = a(Xt,Mt). Given an equilibrium (q
`,∗(Xt,Mt), a∗(Xt,Mt))
we denote the corresponding game functions of producer 1 by vL(x) and vH(x);
and the game functions of producer 2 by gL(x) and gH(x). Here the subscript
indicates the initial value M0 ∈ {L,H} of the Markov chain. These game values
are the discounted cumulative expected profits starting with X0 = x,M0 = i,
vi(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
q1,∗t p(q
1,∗
t , q
2,∗
t ,Mt)− Ca(a∗t )
)
dt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = i] ;
gi(x) = E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtq2,∗t
(
p(q1,∗t , q
2,∗
t ,Mt)− c
)
dt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = i] ,
and must satisfy the Nash optimality conditions
vi(x) = sup
q1,a
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rt
(
q1t p(q
1
t , q
2,∗
t ,Mt)− Ca(at)
)
1{Xt>0} dt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = i]
(2.2)
gi(x) = sup
q2
E
[∫ ∞
0
e−rtq2t
(
p(q1,∗t , q
2
t ,Mt)− c
)
dt
∣∣∣∣X0 = x,M0 = i] , i = L,H.
Thus, given the other player’s equilibrium strategy, each player chooses optimal
strategies for her own production (and exploration). To analyze (2.2), we employ
the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs framework that aims to express game values
through a system of coupled differential equations. Define ∆f(x) := f(x + δ) −
f(x). We also index a generic regime by i = 1, 2 and the other regime by j.
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Assuming the functional forms of demand in (2.1) and exploration costs in (1.3),
the HJB-I ordinary differential equations of vL, vH and gL, gH are
sup
q1i
[
q1i (x)
(
Di − q1i (x)− q2,∗i (x)
)− v′i(x)q1i (x)]+ sup
ai
[aiλ∆vi(x)− Ca(ai)]
+ λij(vj(x)− vi(x))− rvi(x) = 0, (2.3)
sup
q2i
[
q2i (x)
(
Di − q1,∗i (x)− q2i (x)− c
)]− g′i(x)q1,∗i (x) + a∗i (x)λ∆gi(x)
+ λij(gj(x)− gi(x))− rgi(x) = 0. (2.4)
Upon exhaustion of reserves Xt = 0, player 1 can no longer produce, yielding
a temporary monopoly for player 2. However, player 1 remains in the game and
may continue to explore for reserves (financing exploration by borrowing against
future earnings). Fix X0 = 0 and denote by τ ≡ τ1 the time of the first discovery
of new reserves (so that Xt = 0 on [0, τ) and Xτ = δ) and by σ the first transition
time of the Markov chain (Mt). Then by conditioning on τ and σ we have
vi(0) = sup
ai≥0
E
{
1{σ<τ}
[
e−rσvj(0)−
∫ σ
0
e−rtCa(ai) dt
]
(2.5)
+ 1{τ≤σ}
[
e−rτvi(δ)−
∫ τ
0
e−rtCa(ai) dt
] ∣∣∣ X0 = x,M0 = i} ∨ 0.
By stationarity of (Mt) it follows that the optimal exploration rate ai is constant
until τ ∧σ and hence τ ∧σ ∼ Exp(λa+λij) has an exponential distribution. Using
the fact that P(τ < σ) = λai
λai+λi¯i
then leads to
vi(0) = sup
ai≥0
vj(0)λij + vi(δ)λai − Ca(ai)
r + λij + λai
∨ 0, (2.6)
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yielding an implicit condition linking vi(0), vi(δ) and vj(0).
Optimizing for the production rates q` which must be non-negative in (2.3)-
(2.4) yields that the candidate equilibrium strategies are given by
q1,∗i (x) =
1
2
max
(
Di − q2,∗i (x)− v′i(x), 0
)
,
q2,∗i (x) =
1
2
max
(
Di − q1,∗i (x)− c, 0
)
.
(2.7)
For simpler notation, we write z+ ≡ max(z, 0). Figure 2.1 illustrates how (2.7)
is used to determine the equilibrium given a fixed value of say v′H(x). Assuming
C(a) = κ2a+ β2
a2
2
, the candidate optimal exploration rate is similarly
a∗i (x) = [(λ∆vi(x)− κ)+]. (2.8)
Equation (2.8) holds also for x = 0 since the exhaustibility constraint does not
apply to exploration.
We observe that (2.3) yields two coupled equations for vL(x) and vH(x) which
are however autonomous from gi(x). This is due to the state variable (Xt) being
completely controlled by player 1. The system (2.3) features only a first-order
differential of vi(x) due to the continuous decrease in (Xt); it also has two non-
local effects, the term ∆vi(x) arising from jumps induced by exploration successes,
and the term vj(x) − vi(x) due to the regime-shifts in (Mt). Therefore, overall
(2.3) is a system of first-order nonlinear (forward)-delay ODEs in x. Respectively,
(2.4) leads to a first order linear delay-ODE for gL(x) and gH(x) in terms of vL(x)
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and vH(x). However, as already written in (2.7), all the equilibrium production
and exploration strategies depend only on vi(x), and so we will not deal much
with the gi equations, focusing mostly on (2.3).
2.2.1 Game Stages
The maximizers in (2.3)-(2.4) intuitively determine the equilibrium strategies
of the players. Several different equilibrium types are possible due to the con-
straints q1 ≥ 0, q2 ≥ 0 and a ≥ 0 that can be binding. These situations can
be seen through the piecewise nature of (2.3)-(2.4) that arises from the max(·, 0)
terms. They can also be imagined through Figure 2.1: if the two piecewise linear
curves for q1,∗i , q
2,∗
i do not cross in the interior then we have a boundary solution
on one of the axes.
For each L,H, and c fixed, the strategies of the two players depend on the
shadow reserves cost v′i(x), i = L,H, which determines the type of equilibrium at
Xt = x. Depending on the shadow costs, the alternative game types are:
Type I: Interior solution where both players are active: q1 > 0, q2 > 0. This
case arises when v′i(x) satisfies 2c−Di < v′i(x) < c+Di2 .
Type M1: The exhaustible player 1 has a monopoly because q2 = 0. This occurs
when v′i(x) ≤ 2c−Di.
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Type M2: The green player 2 has a monopoly while q1 = 0. This occurs when
v′i(x) ≥ c+Di2 .
In each case we further can have either ai(x) > 0, or ai(x) = 0 (no exploration,
i.e. “saturation” of reserves) depending on the positivity of the term ∆vi(x) − κ
in (2.8).
In the interior game Type I, we have
q1i =
1
3
(Di + c− 2v′i(x)) q2H =
1
3
(Di + v
′
i(x)− 2c), x > 0, (2.9)
and the ODE of vi reduces to
v′i(x) =
Di + c
2
− 3
2
[
(λ10 + r)vi(x)− λijvj(x)− 1
γ
((λ∆vi(x)− κ)+)γ
] 1
2
. (2.10)
In Type M1 equilibrium, exhaustible producer 1 monopolizes the market,
q1i =
1
2
(Di − v′i(x)) , q2i = 0,
and the ODE of vi is given by the monopoly equation
1
2
(Di − v′i(x))2 +
1
γ
((λ∆vi(x)− κ)+)γ + λij(vj(x)− vi(x))− rvi(x) = 0. (2.11)
In Type M2 equilibrium, the green producer 2 monopolizes the market, q1i = 0,
giving q2i =
1
2
(Di − c), and vi(x) is determined through the nonlinear equation
1
γ
((λ∆vi(x)− κ)+)γ + λijvj(x)− (r + λij)vi(x) = 0. (2.12)
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Intuitively, vi(x) is concave, so that x 7→ v′i(x) is decreasing. Thus, Type M2
equilibrium arises for small x (when the shadow cost of exhaustibility is very large,
driving player 1 to sit out); Type I equilibrium arises for moderate x and Type
M1 equilibrium arises for large x where the shadow cost is negligible. We note
that in high demand regime, exhaustible resources production is always positive
for any x > 0 since player 1 cannot expect higher profit by holding on to reserves.
Therefore Type M2 equilibrium may only arise for small x and Mt = L.
Exhaustible production rate q1
G
re
en
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io
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te
q2
 
 
Green production
Exhaustible production
Nash equilibrium ((q1)∗, (q2)∗)
(H− c)+12 (H − v ′H)+
1
2 (H − c)+
(H − v′H)+
Figure 2.1: Nash equilibrium of the Cournot duopoly in high-demand regime.
The two piecewise linear curves show optimal production rates of player
1 and player 2 given v′H(x) and the production rate of the other player
(e.g. q1,∗(x; q2(x), v′H(x))) as defined in (2.7). Equilibrium is achieved when
the curves cross.
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Combining (2.10)-(2.12), the HJB ODEs of vi(x) can be written as the single
piecewise-defined equation
[
2
3
(
Di + c
2
− v′i(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−Di − v′i(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[
(λ∆vi(x)− κ)+
]γ
+ λijvj(x)− (λij + r)vi(x) = 0, i, j = L,H. (2.13)
Remark 2.1. Within a single-agent optimization setting, [22] showed the well-
posedness of the system (2.10) and associated implicit boundary condition (2.22).
In particular, using the functional equations methods of [46], Deshmukh and Pliska
[22] prove that (2.10) has a unique bounded differentiable solution and the opti-
mal controls are indeed (2.9). They moreover show that vi is strictly concave,
i.e. marginal cost of reserves is decreasing in x. However, these analytic tools be-
come unavailable in the presence of free boundaries that arise due to game effects
such as blockading or production shut-down (i.e. other equilibria types beyond Type
I). In particular, the interaction of the non-local term ∆vi(x) with the piecewise-
defined functional form of v′i(x) in (2.13) (and the additional coupling among vi(x)
and vj(x)) poses a major challenge. As a result, we are not able to analytically
establish smoothness of (2.13) in the duopoly model.
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2.2.2 Numerical Scheme
Due to the challenge of implicit boundary condition and the presence of a
“forward” delay term on the semi-infinite domain R+, numerically solving the
system (2.3) (or (2.13)) is nontrivial. We note that the equations have a non-local
term and several free boundaries indicated by the critical values of x that trigger
the (·)+ terms to be zero. In particular, there is xstarti which separates Type M2
and Type I equilibria; xblocki that separates Type I and Type M1 equilibria; and
xsati that separates regions where ai(x) > 0 and ai(x) = 0. The meaning of these
quantities is the production start level (below xstarti production is shut-down); the
blockading level (above xblocki player 2 is blockaded) and the reserves saturation
level (above xsati no exploration takes place).
To solve the HJB-I ODE system we use the iterative scheme in [40] that
originates in the ideas of Davis [20]. Let v
(0)
L (x) and v
(0)
H (x) be the game values
corresponding to the case where resources are completely non-replenishable, so
that no new resource discoveries are possible. Similarly to (2.13) (and removing
the exploration-related term), we have that
[
2
3
(
Di + c
2
− (v(0)i )′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(
2c−Di − (v(0)i )′(x)
)+]2
+ λijv
(0)
j (x)− (λij + r)v(0)i (x) = 0, i, j = L,H, (2.14)
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with boundary conditions v
(0)
L (0) = v
(0)
H (0) = 0, since starting with no reserves
(x = 0) and no possibility of discoveries, player 1 will never have any revenue. We
then define inductively for n ≥ 1 the functions v(n)i via[
2
3
(
Di + c
2
− (v(n)i )′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(
2c−Di − (v(n)i )′(x)
)+]2
+
1
γ
[(
λ(v
(n−1)
i (x+ δ)− v(n)i (x))− κ
)+]γ
+ λijv
(n)
j (x)− (λij + r)v(n)i (x) = 0,
(2.15)
with boundary conditions
v
(n)
i (0) = sup
ai≥0
v
(n)
j (0)λij + v
(n−1)
j (δ)λai − Ca(ai)
r + λij + λai
, i, j = L,H. (2.16)
Note that (2.15)-(2.16) partially uncouple the original equations by making the
non-local term a source term instead. Therefore, (2.15)-(2.16) are now a standard
system of nonlinear first order ODE with an implicit boundary condition at x = 0.
We start the computation with no discovery case n = 0 by solving the system
(2.14). For n ≥ 1, we solve the system (2.15) by using the data from the (n −
1)-st iteration for the forward delay term in the n-th iteration. In numerical
computation, at each x > 0 we start with assuming v′i(x) satisfy any one of the
three equilibrium types and then solve for vi(x) and v
′
i(x). If the computed v
′
i(x)
is consistent with the assumed range of values, the assumption and the results are
correct, otherwise we switch to another assumption to compute vi(x) and v
′
i(x).
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Remark 2.2. The equation (2.15) is an implicit quadratic in v′. To use a basic
time-stepping ODE solver then requires inverting this to directly express v′(x) in
terms of (x, v(x)). Due to the special form above, one obtains v′(x) =
√
F (x, v(x))
where only the positive square root is relevant since v(x) must be increasing. Stan-
dard tools such as fourth-order Runge-Kutta method can be applied to solve the
ODEs. We use Matlab ODE solver function ode45 to solve the ODEs in the
research.
Informally, v(n) represents the game value assuming a horizon of τn, where τn
is the time of n-th resource discovery. It follows that the absolute error |v(n)i (x)−
vi(x)| is bounded by CE[e−rτn ]. In turn, using the fact that exploration rates are
uniformly bounded (in particular a∗i (x) ≤ a∗H(0)∀x) we have by a simple coupling
argument that τn > en (in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance) where
en ∼ Gamma(n, λa∗H(0)), so that E[e−rτn ] = O(Cn) for some constant C < 1. It
follows that vn → v exponentially fast. Practically, we have observed convergence
after 10-20 iterations in all examples presented.
Remark 2.3. The size δ of each new discovery can be random in general. Namely,
we may model discovery amounts via a stochastic sequence δn, n = 1, 2, ..., where
each δn is identically distributed with some distribution Fδ(·) and independent of
everything else in the model (in particular of other δn’s and of past controls).
Introducing Fδ entails replacing vi(x + δ) in the HJB-I equations and boundary
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conditions with Iδ[vi](x) :=
∫∞
0
vi(x + u)Fδ(du). Similarly, one would apply this
integral operator Iδ to v
(n−1) in which is straightforward to handle numerically.
2.2.3 Illustration
Figure 2.2 illustrates the obtained solution of (2.3)-(2.4). We show the game
values, production rates and exploration rates for two different values of player 2
costs c so as to illustrate the basic impact of competition. As expected, vi(x) are
concave increasing; q1i (x) are also concave increasing; q
2
i (x) are convex decreasing,
and ai(x) is convex decreasing (note that in general the control mappings will not
be differentiable in x across the free boundaries so the above characterization is
heuristic). Note that the impact of c is ambiguous. While lower c raises competi-
tion, it may also spur higher exploration efforts since the marginal cost of reserves
could rise. Hence c 7→ ai(x; c) may be non-monotone. In contrast, competition
unambiguously lowers production rates q1i (x) of the exhaustible player and her
game value vi(x).
In the far-field limit x→∞, dependence on reserves vanishes and all quanti-
ties have a limit that can be directly computed via a one-stage static game. In
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particular, we have
lim
x→∞
vL(x) =
1
r
(λ10 + r)
(
L+c
2
− 1
6
(2c− L)+)2 + λ01 (H+c2 − 16(2c−H)+)2
r + λ01 + λ10
;
lim
x→∞
vH(x) =
1
r
λ10
(
L+c
2
− 1
6
(2c− L)+)2 + (λ01 + r) (H+c2 − 16(2c−H)+)2
r + λ01 + λ10
.
Similarly, the limiting values of the controls admit explicit solutions, including
limx→∞ ai(x) = 0.
2.3 Effects of Stochastic Demand on Production
and Exploration
Stochastic demand is one of the key features of our model which is determined
by two characteristics: the demand levels Di and stationary distribution (piL, piH)
of the demand regimes that is driven by the switching rates λij. We analyze the
effects of changes in these parameters on the equilibrium strategies of production
and exploration.
The regime-switching stochastic demand is meant to mimic the macroeco-
nomic business cycle. When the macroeconomy is running low, the demand for
energy is low; when the macroeconomy is running high, the demand for energy
is high and therefore the price function moves up to the high regime. In general,
higher demand (or better opportunities for profit), lead to higher value for the
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Figure 2.2: Duopoly axis game solutions for two different levels of production
cost c: solid curves are for c = 0.3; dashed for c = 0.4. Tope left panel: Game
functions vi(x), gi(x). Bottom left panel: Production rates q
`
i (x), ` = 1, 2.
Bottom right panel: Exploration efforts ai(x) of exhaustible producer 1. We
take linear inverse demand with L = 0.75, H = 1, and switching rates λ01 =
1
3
, λ10 =
1
5
. Exploration costs are Ca(a) = 0.1a+ a
2/2.
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producer and induce both higher production and higher exploration. This is be-
cause the marginal value of reserves rises, stimulating both short-term production
and longer-term extraction. This basic feature is present in all single-parameter
comparative statics we tried, such as unilaterally changing the rates λ01, λ10 or
increasing/decreasing the levels of market demand L,H. Similarly, due to the
intuitive ordering of the two regimes, we expect that changing the regime to
high while keeping all other parameters constant should also increase expected
profit, increase production and increase exploration. Indeed, by a coupling ar-
gument it is easy to show that vH(x) > vL(x). It is also interesting to note
the difference between v′H(x) and v
′
L(x). When x = 0, the game is Type M2
(q1L(x) = q
1
H(x) = 0) which satisfies that v
′
L(x) ≥ L+c2 , v′H(x) = H+c2 , and thus
v′H(x)− v′L(x) ≤ H−L2 . When x > 0 is large enough, the game becomes Type M1
such that v′L(x) = v
′
H(x) = 0 which implies v
′
H(x)−v′L(x) = 0. Since the marginal
values v′L(x), v
′
H(x) of the two regimes are decreasing in x, we can expect that the
difference v′H(x)− v′L(x) is also decreasing in x. The conjecture is summarized as
follows.
Conjecture 1. Suppose that the state space of (Mt) is E = {L,H}. Then for all
x,
0 ≤ v′H(x)− v′L(x) ≤
H − L
2
. (2.17)
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Corollary 1. Suppose Conjecture 1 holds. Then for all x ≥ 0, 0 ≤ q1H(x) −
q1L(x) ≤ H−L2 and aH(x) > aL(x).
Proof. Substituting the conjectured relationship of v′L and v
′
H into the equations
for q1i (x) gives the stated inequalities (note that the upper bound applies in Type
M1 and M2 equilibria only; a tighter bound is possible under Type I equilibrium).
Similarly, we have
∆vL(x) = vL(x+ δ)− vL(x) =
∫ δ
0
v′L(x+ u)du
≤
∫ δ
0
v′H(x+ u)du = vH(x+ δ)− vH(x) = ∆vH(x),
and therefore a∗L(x) = [(λ∆vL(x)− κ)+]γ−1 ≤ [(λ∆vL(x)− κ)+]γ−1 = a∗H(x).
Numerically, we have observed Conjecture 1 holding in all parameter settings
we tried; but in general it is known that comparison of stochastic regimes is ex-
tremely difficult (see an extended discussion on this issue in [22]). Finally, we note
that Conjecture 1 only covers two regimes and the situation where (Mt) modulates
p(~qt) only. See Section 2.4.1 for counterexamples in more general situations.
2.3.1 Limiting Cases
The stationary distribution of the Markov chain (Mt) driving demand regimes
is
piL =
λ10
λ01 + λ10
, piH =
λ01
λ01 + λ10
. (2.18)
49
The game value functions vL, vH of producer 1 under stochastic demand are
bounded above by the value function under the high regime demand Dt ≡ H,
which we denote by u˜H . They are also bounded below by the value function
under the deterministic low-regime demand Dt ≡ L, which we denote by u˜L. As
a result, vL, vH are “averages” of u˜L and u˜H . The following two Lemmas clarify
this interpretation by considering the extreme cases.
Lemma 2.1. We have limλ01→+∞ vL(x) = limλ01→+∞ vH(x) = u˜H , the game value
of the model with fixed demand Dt ≡ H.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 2.2. Let λ01 =
c01

, λ10 =
c10

. As → 0, the game value functions vL(x)
and vH(x) both converge to v¯(x), which is determined by the following delay ODE
piL
[
2
3
(
L+ c
2
− v¯′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c− L− v¯′(x))+
]2
(2.19)
+ piH
[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− v¯′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − v¯′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆v¯(x)− κ)+]γ − rv¯(x) = 0, x > 0
with boundary condition
v¯(0) =
λa¯(0)v¯(δ)− Ca(a¯(0))
r + λa¯(0)
, a¯(0) = [(λ∆v¯(0)− κ)+]γ−1, (2.20)
where pii are given in (2.18).
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Proof. See the Appendix.
The equation (2.19) can have as many as 5 free boundaries due to the multiple
piecewise defined terms (·)+. While we have the basic ordering (L + c)/2 <
(H + c)/2 and 2c − H < 2c − L, the relationship between say (H + c)/2 and
2c − H depends on c. Therefore, the order of all the potential solution pieces
in terms of x is parameter dependent. Moreover, while v¯(x) is expected to be
concave the nonlocal term ∆v¯(x) does not allow to guarantee this and therefore
the a priori ordering of the pieces cannot be fully determined. Compared to the
basic (2.13), (2.19) is of the form (A1 − v′)2 + (A2 − v′)2 = rv so solving the
quadratic for v′ it is possible to obtain multiple positive roots. Determining the
correct root is then done by enforcing the C1 continuity of v′, i.e. making sure
that x 7→ v′(x) is continuous (and decreasing).
Lemma 2.2 illustrates what happens when the macroeconomic environment
becomes more volatile. The parameter  can be thought of as a proxy for volatility.
The lemma shows the homogenization arising as → 0. Indeed, increasing  can
be viewed as increase in market volatility. Figure 2.3 illustrates the behavior of the
value functions and controls in terms of . The value and marginal value of reserves
decreases in high regime and increases in low regime. Therefore the production
rate increases in high regime and decreases in low regime, since holding reserves
becomes more valuable in high regime and less valuable in low regime. Similarly,
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as ↘ 0, the exploration effort decreases in high regime due to decreased marginal
value of a new discovery and increases in low regime.
0 2 4 6 8 100
0.5
1
1.5
2
x
 
 
vL, m = 0.1
vH ,m = 0.1
vL, m = 1
vH ,m = 1
v¯, m =∞
0 1 2 3 4 50
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
0.3
0.35
x
E
x
p
lo
ra
ti
on
eff
or
ts
a
L
,
a
H
,
a¯
 
 
aL, m = 0.1
aH ,m = 0.1
aL, m = 1
aH ,m = 1
a¯,m =∞
Figure 2.3: Left panel: convergence of the game functions vi(x) → v¯(x) as
λ01, λ10 → ∞ together. Right panel: convergence of the exploration effort
ai(x) → a¯(x). We take λ01 = m/3, λ10 = m/5, with m = 0.1, 1 as well as the
limiting solution defined in Lemma 2.2.
2.3.2 Production Shut-Down in Low-Demand Regime
Due to fluctuating profit levels across the macroeconomic regimes, there may
arise situations in which player 1 voluntarily shuts down production in the low
demand regime when reserves level x is small. We define xstart := inf{x > 0 :
qL(x) > 0}, the critical reserves level below which production stops. Heuristically,
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below xstart marginal value of reserves is so high relative to the low price offered
that v′L(x) > L leading to q
1
L(x) = 0 in (2.7).
As mentioned before, such a shutdown (M2-equilibrium) can only happen in
the low regime and is driven by the expectation of collecting higher revenue once
demand reverts to the high regime. Typically, xstart is quite low, so M2-equilibrium
arises just before total exhaustion of reserves. There are two motivations for
production shut-down. The quantity effect reflects the extra profits available
under high demand. Thus, a sufficiently large difference in demand levels across
regimes is required for an M2 equilibrium to appear. The time effect reflects the
anticipated waiting time until high demand which is important due to the present
value discounting involved. Thus, for M2 equilibrium it is necessary that the
holding time in the low regime is sufficiently short relative to the discount rate r.
Figure 2.4 illustrates these phenomena. The left panel of Figure 2.4 shows that
xstart is increasing in λ01. This is the time effect: as λ01 increases, the exhaustible
producer is anticipating imminent higher profits and is more willing to shut down
production to save reserves for that purpose. Asymptotically, as λ01 →∞, xstart
converges to x˜start := inf{x > 0 : L − v˜H(x) > 0}, where v˜H(x) is the game
function corresponding to the constant-high-demand case, see Lemma 2.1. The
middle panel of Figure 2.4 shows that when H is close to L there is no production
shutdown, whereas as H increases, xstart increases in H unboundedly. This is the
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quantity effect: larger H increases the marginal value of reserves which makes the
situation v′L(x) > L more likely.
0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 30
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
λ01
x
s
t
a
r
t
0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
H
x
s
t
a
r
t
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Green production cost c
x
s
t
a
r
t
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Finally, the right panel of Figure 2.4 shows xstart as a function of green pro-
duction cost c. We observe an ambiguous effect of competition on voluntary
shutdown. Because shutdown only happens with very low reserves, it takes place
when the green producer 2 is generally the “leader” of the market and hence
the equilibrium rates are very sensitive to the green leader’s costs. When c is
very small, competition lowers the value of reserves and makes the marginal value
large. Therefore, xstart is large when c is small. At moderate c, the competition is
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alleviated and the game becomes in favor of the exhaustible producer 1, thus the
exhaustible production is expanded due to decreased marginal value of reserves.
When c is close to L, green production is very low or even blockaded in low regime,
causing producer 1 to raise production under low demand, and eschew shutdown
xstart = 0 . As c increases beyond c > L, the exhaustible producer begins to
lead the market under both regimes, and is driven by the quantity/time effects to
shutdown production. Thus, xstart increases in c when L < c < H. When c = H,
the green producer 2 is completely blockaded in both the low and high regimes,
thus the model reduces to exhaustible production monopoly. It also deserves our
attention that in the setting c ≈ 0 that is most favorable to the green producer,
xstart is significantly larger than in a player 1 monopoly market (c = H). This
is because competition encourages producer 1 to conserve reserves in low regime,
much more so than in the monopoly setting.
2.4 Extensions of Basic Model
2.4.1 Multiple Demand Regimes
We could similarly analyze the situation where the market demand switches
among n > 2 macroeconomics regimes such that the demand function is given by
pt = Mt − q1 − q2, Mt ∈ {D1, D2, ..., Dn}, 0 < D1 < D2 < ... < Dn.
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Denote the generator of the Markov chain (Mt) as
Λ =

D1 D2 · · · Dn
D1 −
∑
j 6=1 λ1j λ12 · · · λ1n
D2 λ21 −
∑
j 6=2 λ2j · · · λ2n
...
...
...
. . .
...
Dn λn1 λn2 · · · −
∑
j 6=n λnj

Then (2.3) is generalized to
sup
q1i
[
q1i (x)
(
Di − q1i (x)− q2,∗i (x)
)− v′i(x)q1i (x)]+ sup
ai
[aiλ∆vi(x)− Ca(ai)]
+
∑
j 6=i
λij(vj(x)− vi(x))− rvi(x) = 0, (2.21)
and similarly for gi(x), and the boundary conditions are
vi(0) = sup
ai≥0
∑
j 6=i vj(0)λij + vi(δ)λai − Ca(ai)
r +
∑
j 6=i λij + λai
, i = 1, 2, ..., n. (2.22)
The candidate optimizers a∗i (x), q
`,∗
i (x), i = L,H, l = 1, 2, remains as in (2.7)-
(2.8).
With multiple regimes, some of the intuitive comparative statics become un-
available. For example, Conjecture 1 states that with only two regimes the pro-
duction rates (and hence the shadow marginal costs of reserves) appear to be al-
ways ordered. Namely, production and exploration efforts are larger under higher
demand. For a generic chain (Mt), such monotonicity no longer necessarily holds.
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As explained, the game values can be thought of as “averages” of the corre-
sponding rewards under fixed demand regimes. The averaging is done in terms
of the expected discounted time spent in each regime given M0. With more than
two regimes, this averaging is non-trivial: even if M0 is high today, the future
prospects could be worse compared to a lower starting point. For instance, con-
sider the case where the market demand switches cyclically among three levels
D1 < D2 < D3, with a generator of the form
Λ =

−λ12 λ12 0
0 −λ23 λ23
λ31 0 −λ31
 . (2.23)
Thus, (Mt) moves cyclically along D1 → D2 → D3 → D1. If the proportion
of time spent in regime 2 is significantly longer than in regime 3 (namely λ12 
λ23  λ31), then regime 3 could be a worse starting point than regime 2. This
situation is illustrated in Figure 2.5 that shows that vi(x) are no longer monotone
(and neither are q1i (x) or ai(x)) in i. Therefore, the original ordering of Di gets
shuﬄed due to the influence of the transition rates λij.
A further generalization would be to consider continuous fluctuations of mar-
ket demand, for instance taking (Mt) as an Ito diffusion modulating the price
function. Some of the standard choices could include a (Geometric) Brownian
motion factor to model for example the evolution of total economy GDP, or a
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stationary Ornstein-Uhlenbeck factor to model the macroeconomic business cycle
relative to the long-run baseline. Such a model would require replacing the cur-
rent HJB-I equations (2.3)-(2.4) by a partial differential equation since the new
game values would be a function v(x,m) of both the reserves level x and the
demand level M0 = m. If Mt is a diffusion, this will lead to a parabolic HJB-I
system. The present theory of such systems, including smoothness of the game
values, existence of equilibrium, etc. is not well-developed. In our context some of
the additional difficulties include (i) non-standard implicit boundary conditions
at x = 0; (ii) non-local terms arising from discrete exploration discoveries; (iii) de-
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generacy in the x variable that has only first-order dynamics (no volatility) and is
fully endogenized by the player strategies. Overcoming all these challenges (that
extend beyond the analytic properties to numerics and economic interpretation)
is well beyond the scope of this paper. Indeed, we believe that the extra realism
gained from incorporating (Mt) as a continuous factor is not worth the additional
model complexity. Our take is that all models are stylized and are aiming at basic
insights rather than complete practicality.
2.4.2 Stochastic Production Costs
One may use the stochastic factor to modulate other game parameters. For
example, the production costs of player 2 (the green producer) might be changing
over time. Such fluctuations could be due to varying technology costs; changing
government policies such as renewable energy subsidies; or non-constant financing
costs. To capture this setup we could then assume that c = c(Mt) is modulated
by the chain (Mt) whereas the demand is for simplicity now fixed at some D¯.
The resulting game values would solve HJB-I equations essentially matching
(2.3)-(2.4), except that player 2 production costs ci = c(Di) now differ across
regimes. Figure 2.6 illustrates the solution assuming a two-state (Mt). The pa-
rameters are similar to those in Figure 2.2 allowing a degree of comparison. As
before, green production rises when costs are low (regime 1) and falls when costs
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become larger. In particular, the game can switch between Type I and type M1
equilibria due to regime change. Moreover, because exploration efforts of player
1 are not monotone in c in the setup of Section 2.2, they are also non-monotone
here, see right panel of Figure 2.6. Thus, for some reserve levels x, a drop in
competitor’s production costs may induce increased motivation to explore.
Remark 2.4. One could also imagine fluctuating production costs of player 1.
In fact, with linear inverse demand, one may interpret the choke level D in p =
D − q1 − q2 as the net difference between demand level and production costs for
the exhaustible producer (recall that in Section 2.2 we took these fixed production
costs to be zero for convenience). Hence, the original model that takes D = D(Mt)
is equivalent to assuming that c1 = c1(Mt) with a baseline case c
1(D1) = 0.
One could also modulate other parts of the model, such as the exploration costs
C(a;Mt) (indeed, there was plenty of evidence that E&P costs in the oil industry
rose sharply during the bull oil market of 2006-08 as increased demand spurred
all companies to replenish reserves). Another idea that was suggested in [22] is
to modulate the discovery rate λ (so as to capture for instance approach of the
global exhaustibility of the resource). In general, one could mix and match above
features, taking both c(Mt) and D(Mt) to be dependent on the macroeconomy. In
that situation, there is no longer a clear ordering of the regimes. For example, it
could be the case that in regime 1, demand is high but so is the competition with
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green production; in regime 1 demand is lower but green producer is blockaded.
Our above investigations can serve as a guide to disentangle the opposite effects
that would then be induced on q`(x) and a(x).
2.4.3 More Players
Our main model in this chapter featured two players. These are meant to be
representative of the exhaustible and renewable producers, for example oil and
“green” energy industries competing on the electricity market. By having only
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a single player with reserves, our continuous state variable Xt is one-dimensional
which greatly facilitates the analysis. It would of course be more realistic to
include multiple players with reserves (e.g. different type of conventional fossil
fuels). An immediate extension would be to analyze the duopoly among two
exhaustible producers. The difference in their reserves X1t , X
2
t would determine
the asymmetry in the game and decide who is the leader based on the respective
shadow reserve costs. A version of such a model without exploration or stochastic
demand was treated in [31]. Given the major challenges encountered there (in
particular regularity issues for the game functions), this is another extension that
we are not able to fully address here.
Beyond two players, the theory of Cournot oligopolies is rudimentary. See [39]
for analysis of Bertrand oligopolies in deterministic markets (with no exploration
nor stochastic factor). Consideration of more than two non-symmetric players
will necessarily be challenging due to the exploding dimensionality. Moreover, it
raises thorny questions regarding private and public information, namely whether
all players can be fully informed about all other players given the complexity of the
game. Since real life markets actually feature hundreds of agents, another useful
approximation would be to study an infinity of players using the framework of
mean field games [4]. Namely, one might consider the strategic interaction among
a continuum of exhaustible producers with exploration. Related models without
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exploration was analyzed in the deterministic case by [29] and in the stochastic
case (where reserves Xt receive Brownian shocks) by [16]. In the following chapters
3 and 4, we study the Cournot game with a continuum of players in the mean
field game framework. What is new in our research, comparing with [29, 16], lies
in that the exploration effort is modeled by a controlled jump process in the mean
field game framework.
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Chapter 3
Mean Field Games with a
Continuum of Producers
In this chapter we study a specific mean field game model with a continuum
of exhaustible producers in terms of both analytical and numerical aspects. This
chapter is organized as follows. In Section 3.1, we introduce the MFG model in
the limit N →∞ corresponding to the N -player Cournot game model introduced
in section 1.3.4. In Section 3.2, we discuss the doubly coupled system of HJB
and transport equations that characterize the mean field game Nash equilibrium.
In Section 3.3, we introduce numerical methods to solve the system of HJB and
transport equations for the mean field game Nash equilibrium. Some numerical
examples are presented.
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3.1 Mean field game problem with a continuum
of players
As number of players becomes very large N → ∞, thanks to the Law of
Large Numbers, the empirical distribution ηN , defined by (1.8), is expected to
converge to the normalized CDF η. The function η(t, ·) is regarded as the reserves
distribution among all players at date t, which means, for a given t and x, the
proportion of all players at time t with reserves level greater than or equal to x.
Correspondingly the production and exploration controls (1.9) take the Marko-
vian feedback form
qt = q(t,Xt; η(t, ·)), at = a(t,Xt; η(t, ·)). (3.1)
To re-solve for the supply-demand equilibrium clearing price, we analyze the total
averaged quantity Q(t) of production at time t, defined as the (Stieltjes) integral
of a representative player’s quantity of production with respect to the reserves
distribution,
Q(t) := −
∫ ∞
0
q(t, x; η) η(t, dx). (3.2)
Note that η(t, x) is decreasing in x, thus we add a negative sign to the integral
in order to keep Q(t) positive. In turn, Q(t) determines the market price via the
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inverse demand function
p(t) = D−1(Q(t)) = L+
∫ ∞
0
q(t, x; η) η(t, dx), (3.3)
where the parameter L can be regarded as the cap on prices as supply vanishes.
For a representative player who starts with initial reserves level Xt = x, the
mean-field objective functional is defined analogously to (1.5):
J (q, a; t, x, η) := E
{∫ T
t
[
D−1 (Q(s)) qs − Cq(qs)− Ca(as)
]
e−r(s−t) ds
∣∣∣∣Xt = x, η} .
(3.4)
Above the strategies (qt, at) take the Markovian feedback form (3.1) and the re-
serves distribution (η(t, ·)) is a probability CDF for all s ∈ [t, T ]. We again remark
that the profit of a player depends on all the other players through the mean field
term Q(t). According to [3], we define the mean field game Nash equilibrium of
our model as
Definition 3.1 (Mean field game Markov Nash equilibrium). A MFG MNE is a
triple (q∗, a∗, η∗) of processes on [0, T ] such that, denoting by X∗t the solution of
dX∗t = −q∗t dt+ δdN∗t , t ≥ 0, X∗0 ∼ η∗(0, ·), (3.5)
then η∗(t, ·) = P(X∗t ≥ x) is the distribution of X∗t , ∀t ∈ [0, T ] and
J (q∗, a∗; t, x, η∗) ≥ J (q, a; t, x, η∗), ∀(q, a) ∈ A. (3.6)
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Remark 3.1. The definition of MFG equilibrium 3.1 consists of two conditions.
One condition, which we can call optimality condition, is that each producer
chooses strategy (q∗, a∗) which gives optimal game value, given the others’ strate-
gies. The second condition, which we can call consistency condition, is that the
reserves dynamics of each player under the control of the strategy (q∗, a∗) has the
upper cumulative distribution function η∗ that is the same as the one that enters
the objective functional.
In Section 3.2, we introduce a numerical scheme to search for the mean field
game Nash equilibrium defined in Definition 3.1, which is the core problem of this
paper.
3.2 Mean field game Nash equilibrium
According to [34, 38], solving for MFG MNE involves two partial differential
equations. One equation is the HJB equation of the game value function of a
representative player, which is derived by a dynamic programming principle. Op-
timal production and exploration strategies (q∗, a∗) can be obtained from the HJB
equation. The other equation is the transport equation for the distribution η∗ of
reserves process X∗ controlled by the strategies (q∗, a∗) obtained from the HJB
equation.
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Section 3.2.1, treats the HJB equation associated to the game value function of
a representative agent. The PDE that characterizes the evolution of the reserves
distribution will be discussed in Section 3.2.2. The overall coupled system asso-
ciated to the MFG MNE is taken up in Section 3.2.3 and approached through an
iterative scheme similar to [29, 16]. Details of numerical methods and examples
will be discussed in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 Game value function of a representative player
Let us fix a sequence of probability CDF’s η(t, ·). Associated with the objective
functional (3.4), we define the game value function vη(t, x) of a representative
player by
vη(t, x) := sup
(q,a)∈A
J (q, a; t, x, η)
= sup
(q,a)∈A
E
{∫ T
t
[p(s; η)qs − Cq(qs)− Ca(as)] e−r(s−t)ds
∣∣∣∣ Xt = x} , (3.7)
where the player chooses optimal production rate q(t,Xt; η) and exploration rate
a(t,Xt; η) from the set A of Markovian feedback controls. Note that above η is
treated as an exogenous parameter, while the price p(·; η) is still endogenous being
a function of total production p(t; η(t, ·)) = D−1 (Q(t)). As we will see, this in
fact introduces a global dependence between the map x 7→ q(t, x) and p(t).
Define the forward difference operator ∆x as ∆xv(t, x) := v(t, x+ δ)− v(t, x).
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Lemma 3.1. The game value function v(t, x) defined by (3.7) satisfies the fol-
lowing HJB equation
0 =
∂
∂t
vη(t, x)− rvη(t, x) + 1
2β1
[(
p(t; η(t, ·))− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)
)+]2
+
1
2β2
[
(λ(t)∆xv
η(t, x)− κ2)+
]2
, (3.8)
with terminal condition vη(T, x) = 0, where the optimal qη(t, x) and aη(t, x) are
given by
qη(t, x) =
1
β1
(
L−Q(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)
)+
, (3.9)
aη(t, x) =
1
β2
(λ(t)∆xv
η(t, x)− κ2)+ , (3.10)
with Qη(t) uniquely determined by the equation
Qη(t) +
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Qη(t)
)+
η(t, dx) = 0. (3.11)
The price p(t) depends on qη and the given reserves distribution η via (3.3).
Proof. The associated HJB equation of (3.7) derived by the dynamic programming
principle, is
0 =
∂
∂t
vη(t, x)− rvη(t, x) + sup
a≥0
[−Ca(a) + aλ(t)∆xvη(t, x)] (3.12)
+ sup
q≥0
[
p(t; η(t, ·))q − Cq(q)− q ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)
]
,
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where the forward difference term ∆xv(t, x) is due to the jumps in the reserves
dynamics. The optimal exploration rate aη is determined by the first order con-
dition
aη(t, x) = arg max
a≥0
[−Ca(a) + aλ(t)∆xvη(t, x)] = 1
β2
(λ(t)∆xv
η(t, x)− κ2)+ ,
(3.13)
where we plugged the quadratic form of Ca from (1.3). Similarly, the optimal
production rate qη should satisfy
qη(t, x) = argmaxq≥0 [p(t, η(t, ·))q − Cq(q)] .
The first order condition for qη(t, x) is
0 =
∂
∂q
[
p(t, η(t, ·))q∗(t, x)− Cq(qη(t, x))− qη(t, x) ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)
]
⇔ β1qη(t, x) =
(
p(t, η(t, ·))− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)
)+
. (3.14)
Recalling that p(t, η(t, ·)) = L−Qη(t) yields (3.9). Integrating the right-hand side
of (3.9) with respect to η(t, ·),
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q(t)
)+
η(t, dx) =
∫ ∞
0
qη(t, x)η(t, dx) = −Q(t).
(3.15)
Thus, Qη(t)) satisfies G(Qη(t)) = 0 as in (3.11) where
G(Q) = Q+
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q
)+
η(t, dx).
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Assuming L > κ1 (otherwise production is never profitable and Q(t) = 0), we
have G(0) > 0 and G((L− κ1)+) < 0, and a unique root Q(t) exists ∈ [0, L− κ1]
since Q 7→ G(Q) is continuous and strictly decreasing. Note that Q 7→ G(Q) is
continuous because for arbitrary  ≶ 0 we have as → 0 that
lim
→0
G(Q+ ) = lim
→0
[
Q+ +
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q− 
)+
η(t, dx)
]
= Q+ lim
→0
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q− 
)+
η(t, dx)
= Q+
∫ ∞
0
lim
→0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q− 
)+
η(t, dx)
= Q+
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
vη(t, x)−Q
)+
η(t, dx)
= G(Q),
where the exchange of the limit lim→0 and the integral
∫∞
0
· η(t, dx) is justified by
bounded convergence theorem, as − ∫∞
0
1 η(t, dx) = 1 < ∞ and the integrand is
uniformly bounded for all , i.e.,
∣∣∣ 1β1 (L− κ1 − ∂∂xvη(t, x)−Q− )+∣∣∣ ≤ 1β1 (L−κ1).
Finally (3.8) follows by using (3.13) and (3.14) in (3.12).
We observe two non-standard features of the HJB equation (3.8). First, the
optimal production control (3.9) does not only depend on the individual producer’s
value function ∂
∂x
vη(t, x), but also on the reserves distribution of all the players
through the mean field term
∫∞
0
∂
∂z
vη(t, z)η(t, dz). Second, (3.8) contains two
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non-local terms: the forward difference vη(t, x + δ) − vη(t, x) and the integral∫∞
0
∂
∂z
vη(t, z)η(t, dz).
The HJB equation has two boundary conditions. First, at t = T we take
v(T, x) = 0 as no more production is assumed possible beyond the prescribed
horizon. Second, the exhaustibility condition x ≥ 0 imposes a boundary condi-
tion at x = 0 similar to the model [40] for a single exhaustible producer. Since
production q(t, 0) = 0 is zero on the boundary x = 0, the game value function
vη(t, x)|x=0 satisfies
0 =
∂
∂t
vη(t, 0)− rvη(t, 0) + sup
a≥0
[−Ca(a) + aλ(t)∆xvη(t, 0)]
=
∂
∂t
vη(t, 0)− rvη(t, 0) + 1
2β2
[
(λ(t)∆xv
η(t, 0)− κ2)+
]2
, 0 ≤ t < T.
(3.16)
We will use the boundary condition equation (3.16) in the numerical schemes.
3.2.2 Transport equation of reserves distribution
In this section we study evolution of the reserves distribution through the
transport equation of the upper-cumulative distribution function η(t, ·) of the
reserves process Xt from (1.2) where Nt is a point process with controlled rate
λ(t)at, and the production rate qt = q(t,Xt) and exploration rate at = a(t,Xt)
are given, i.e. treated as exogenous inputs.
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When reserves reach zero Xt = 0, production shuts down qt = 0. With
exploration effort being made, the reserves level Xt can bounce back to Xτ = δ,
however the waiting time until next discovery is strictly positive. As a result,
P(Xt = 0) > 0, i.e. the distribution of Xt has a point mass at x = 0. Thus to
study the evolution of the distribution of Xt, we consider two parts: the upper-
cumulative distribution function η(t, x) = P (Xt ≥ x) in the interior x > 0; and
the boundary probability pi(t) := P(Xt = 0) = 1 − η(t, 0+). The upper-CDF
η(t, x) is regarded as the proportion of players with reserves level greater than or
equal to x, and pi(t) is interpreted as the proportion of producers with no reserves.
The following proposition gives the system of PDEs that the pair (pi(t), η(t, x))
satisfy. See the proof in Appendix A.3.
Proposition 3.1 (Transport equation). The distribution of the reserves process
Xt is characterized by the pair (pi(t), η(t, x)), where pi(t) = P(Xt = 0), η(t, x) =
P(Xt ≥ x), 0 < x <∞, satisfy the following system of differential equations (note
that the partial x-derivative on the first line is taken from the right x ↓ 0 since
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1 = η(t, 0) > η(t, 0+) is discontinuous at x = 0)
pi(t) = 1− η(t, 0+); (3.17a)
∂
∂t
η(t, x) = λ(t)a(t, 0)pi(t)−
∫ x
0+
λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz) + q(t, x)
∂
∂x
η(t, x), 0 < x ≤ δ;
(3.17b)
∂
∂t
η(t, x) = −
∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz) + q(t, x)
∂
∂x
η(t, x), x > δ. (3.17c)
with given initial condition η(0, x) = η0(x) and pi(0) = p0 = 1− η0(0+).
The discontinuity of η(t, ·) at x = 0 generates higher order discontinuities at
x = δ, 2δ, 3δ, · · · . Indeed, at x = kδ only the first (k − 1) derivatives of η(t, x)
exist. In other words, the distribution of Xt has a point mass at x = 0, a first-
order discontinuity (non-continuous density) at x = δ and a smooth density for
all other x > 0. This non-smoothness is the reason why we do not work with the
density m(t, x) = − ∂
∂x
η(t, x).
Remark 3.2. The size of δ of each new discovery can be random in general.
We may model discovery amounts via a stochastic sequence δn, n = 1, 2, . . . ,
where each δn is identically distributed with some distribution Fδ(·) and indepen-
dent of everything else in the model. Introducing Fδ entails replacing the integral∫ x
x−δ λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz) in (3.17c) with
∫∞
0
F (du)
∫ x
x−u λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz). Similarly,
in the HJB equation we would replace v(t, x + δ) with
∫∞
0
v(t, x + u)Fδ(du). For
simplicity we stick to fixed discovery sizes for the rest of the article.
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3.2.3 System of HJB-transport equations
To recap, the MFG MNE is defined by the HJB equation (3.7) where we plug-
in the equilibrium CDF η∗ (and exhausted proportion pi∗(t)), and the transport
equation (3.17) where we plug-in the equilibrium q∗ and a∗. The equilibrium price
process is p∗(t) = L+
∫∞
0
q∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz). The resulting system is summarized in
the following.
Proposition 3.2 (MFG PDEs). The mean field game Nash equilibrium (q∗, a∗, η∗)
is determined by the HJB equation:
0 =
∂
∂t
v(t, x)− rv(t, x) + [−Ca(a∗(t, x)) + a∗(t, x)λ(t)∆xv(t, x)]
+
[
p∗(t)q∗(t, x)− Cq(q∗(t, x))− q∗(t, x) ∂
∂x
v(t, x)
]
, 0 < x, 0 ≤ t < T,
(3.18)
where the q∗(t, x) and a∗(t, x) are given by
q∗(t, x) =
1
β1
(
L−Q(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v(t, x)
)+
, (3.19)
a∗(t, x) =
1
β2
(λ(t)∆xv(t, x)− κ2)+ , (3.20)
with Q(t) uniquely determined by the equation
Q(t) = −
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v(t, x)−Q(t)
)+
η∗(t, dx),
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and the transport equation:
pi∗(t) = 1− η∗(t, 0+); (3.21a)
∂
∂t
η∗(t, x) = λ(t)a∗(t, 0)pi∗(t)−
∫ x
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz) + q∗(t, x)
∂
∂x
η∗(t, x), 0 < x ≤ δ;
(3.21b)
∂
∂t
η∗(t, x) = −
∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz) + q∗(t, x)
∂
∂x
η∗(t, x), x > δ.
(3.21c)
The HJB equation and transport equation are doubly coupled with η∗ enter-
ing the HJB equation through the aggregate production which is an integral of
optimal production rates q∗(t, x) with respect to the mean-field reserves distribu-
tion η∗(t, dx). Conversely, the optimal production and exploration rates (q∗, a∗)
obtained from the HJB equation of a representative player drive the reserves dis-
tribution η∗.
Existence, uniqueness, and regularity of the solutions of the system of MFG
PDEs is still an ongoing challenge and an area of active research. For the sys-
tem (3.18)- (3.21) the difficulty in proving existence and uniqueness of solutions
lies in the non-local coupling term
∫∞
0
∂
∂x
v(t, x)η(t, dx) and forward delay term
∆xv(t, x) = v(t, x+ δ)− v(t, x). Bensoussan et al. [4] gave a comprehensive study
on linear-quadratic MFGs, in which the cost functional is quadratic in all state
variables, control variables and the mean field terms; while the controlled dynam-
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ics of state variables are linear and also consist of mean field terms. It was shown
that equilibrium solution exists uniquely for one dimension case. For dimension
higher than one, a sufficient condition for the unique existence of the equilibrium
strategy is also provided. Cardaliaguet et al. [6] gave detailed proof of existence
and uniqueness of equilibrium solution for mean field games of first order with
local coupling term. Cardaliaguet et al. [7] proved the existence and uniqueness
of equilibrium solution for mean field game of second order with local coupling
term. A local coupling term of a player at (t, x) is a function F (t, x,m(t, x))
that enters the integrand of game value function, where m(t, x) is the density of
players’ states. The function F (t, x,m(t, x)) represents the interaction of a player
at (t, x) with other players at the same location x and time t. In our model a
player’s game value v(t, x) at time t and location x depends on all other players
through the term
∫∞
0
∂
∂x
v(t, x)η(t, dx) which is non-local because it is the sum of
all other players’ marginal game values at the same time t.
A common feature that our model (3.18)-(3.21) shares with the Cournot mod-
els in [16, 17] is the non-local term
∫∞
0
∂
∂x
v(t, x)η(t, dx). Existence and uniqueness
of the solutions to the system of second order mean field game partial differential
equations introduced by [16, 17] are studied in [26, 27]. [26] proved existence
and uniqueness of solutions to the system of mean field game partial differential
equations in [16, 17] with Dirichlet boundary conditions that are associated with
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the situation where the reserves are limited and players are unable to renew their
stock after exhaustion. [27] proved existence and uniqueness of solutions to the
mean field game partial differential equations in [16, 17] with Neumann boundary
conditions which are associated with the situation that players are able to re-
new their stock after exhaustion. [27] further proved existence and uniqueness of
weak solutions to the corresponding first order system at the deterministic limit,
which coincides with the non-exploration case in our model. That is, existence
and uniqueness of solution to the system (3.18)-(3.21) with λ = 0 are proved,
according to [27]. First order mean field game partial differential equations with
forward delay term of the form ∆xv(t, x) = v(t, x+δ)−v(t, x) due to jump process
in our model, to the best of our knowledge, has not been discussed in any litera-
tures about existence, uniqueness, and regularity. The literatures [4, 6, 7, 26, 27]
all consider mean field games with state variables driven by Brownian motions,
which lead to second order partial differential equations.
The MFG framework links the individual strategic behavior of each producer
with the macro-scale organization of the market. Therefore the main economic
insights concern the resulting aggregate quantities that describe the overall evo-
lution of the market. For this purpose, we let Q(t) be the total production at
time t, A(t) the total discovery, and R(t) the total reserves, which are defined
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respectively as
Q(t) = −
∫ ∞
0
q∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx), (3.22)
R(t) =
∫ ∞
0
η∗(t, x)dx, (3.23)
A(t) = −δ
∫ ∞
0
λ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx). (3.24)
Note that R(t) =
∫∞
0
P(Xt ≥ x)dx = E[Xt] justifying its meaning of total reserves.
The following Lemma 3.2 shows the relation between these quantities of interest.
It can be interpreted as conservation of mass for the reserves: at the macro-scale
total reserves change is simply the net difference between reserves additions (via
new discoveries A(·)) and reserves consumption (via production Q(·)).
Lemma 3.2. We have the relation
d
dt
R(t) = −Q(t) + A(t), i.e. R(t) = R(0)−
∫ t
0
Q(s) ds+
∫ t
0
A(s) ds.
(3.25)
Proof. We integrate both sides of the transport equation (3.21) with respect to x
over (0,∞] to obtain∫ ∞
0+
∂
∂t
η∗(t, x)dx
= −
=:I1︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ δ
0+
(∫ x
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
)
dx−
=:I2︷ ︸︸ ︷∫ ∞
δ
(∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
)
dx
+
∫ ∞
0+
(
q∗(t, x)
∂
∂x
η∗(t, x)
)
dx. (3.26)
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For the last term by the definition of the Stieltjes integral, the integrator is equiv-
alently ∂
∂x
η∗(t, x)dx = η∗(t, dx). We apply integration-by-parts to the first two
terms of the right hand side of (3.26) to obtain
I1 =
[
x
∫ x
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
]δ
0+
−
∫ δ
0+
x
∂
∂x
(∫ x
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
)
dx
= δ
∫ δ
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)−
∫ δ
0+
xλ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx), and (3.27)
I2 =
[
x
∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
]x=∞
x=δ
−
∫ ∞
δ
x
∂
∂x
(∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
)
dx
= −δ
∫ δ
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz)
−
[∫ ∞
δ
xλ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx)−
∫ ∞
0+
(x+ δ)λ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx)
]
= −δ
∫ δ
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, z)η∗(t, dz) +
∫ δ
0+
xλ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx)
+ δ
∫ ∞
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx). (3.28)
The left hand side of (3.26) can be written as∫ ∞
0+
∂
∂t
η∗(t, x)dx =
d
dt
∫ ∞
0+
η∗(t, x)dx, (3.29)
where the exchange of the partial differential operator and the integral is justified
by the Leibniz integral rule under the condition that both η∗(t, x) and ∂
∂t
η∗(t, x)
are continuous in the domain (t, x) ∈ [0,∞)×(0,∞). By substituting (3.27)-(3.29)
into the equation (3.26), we have
d
dt
∫ ∞
0+
η∗(t, x)dx = −δ
∫ ∞
0+
λ(t)a∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx) +
∫ ∞
0+
q∗(t, x)η∗(t, dx),
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which gives (3.25).
3.3 Numerical methods and examples
We use an iterative scheme to numerically solve the system of HJB equa-
tion (3.18) and transport equation (3.21), similar to the approach in [29, 16].
The Picard-like iterations start with an initial price process p(0)(t) as an input
into the MFG value function (3.8), which reduces to a standard optimization
problem for the production and exploration rates (q(0), a(0)). Then we input
(q(0), a(0)) into the equation (3.17) of reserves evolution to solve for η(0)(·, ·).
The q(0) and η(0) obtained are used to update the price (3.3), i.e., p(1)(t) =
1
2
[
D−1
(− ∫∞
0
q(0)(t, x)η(0)(t, dx)
)
+ p(0)
]
. The updated price p(1)(t) is then used
for a new iteration. As k →∞, the iterations are expected to converge to a fixed
point, i.e. a triple (q∗, a∗, η∗) that simultaneously satisfies the HJB equation (3.18)
and transport equation (3.21).
The basic strategy we employ is a finite-difference scheme which replaces
derivatives with discretized increments of the respective functions over a grid. For
the latter purpose we restrict to a bounded time-space domain [0, T ]×[0, Xmax] and
create a gridded partition. Specifically, we partition the space domain [0, Xmax]
using a mesh 0 = x0 < x1 < ... < xM = Xmax, with equal mesh size ∆x =
xm − xm−1,m = 1, . . . ,M and the time domain [0, T ] using a mesh 0 = t0 < t1 <
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... < tN = T with tn = n∆t. The mesh sizes ∆x = 0.1,∆t = 0.01 are fixed
upfront and re-used in all the different computations below. Particularly, for
transport equation (3.17a) the values η(t, ·) and q(t, ·) at x = 0+ are numerically
approximated by η(t, x1) and q(t, x1), respectively.
In Section 3.3.1, we introduce the numerical method to solve the HJB equation
of a representative player’s game value function with price p(t) exogenously given.
In Section 3.3.2, we introduce the numerical method to solve the equation (3.17)
of reserves distribution controlled by the optimal (q, a) obtained in the previous
step. In Section 3.3.3, we show the iterative scheme to solve the coupled HJB
and transport equations. Examples of stationary mean field game are given and
discussed in Section 4.1. Section 4.2 introduces numerical method and examples
of fluid limit model introduced in Section 4.2. For computational purpose we
need to prescribe the values of the coefficients in the system of equations and the
time-space domain [0, T ]× [0, Xmax] of solutions, which are summarized in Table
3.1.
κ1,2 0.1 r 0.1
β1,2 1 Xmax 80
δ 1 T 50
L 5 - -
Table 3.1: Values of coefficients used for all examples in Section 3.3.
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3.3.1 Numerical scheme for the HJB equation
In this section we solve for mean field game value function v(t, x) defined by
(3.8) with an exogenously given price p(t). Treating p(t) as exogenous allows us to
avoid the production control formula in (3.9) which has a mean-field dependence
via
∫∞
0
∂
∂z
v(t, z)η(t, dz). Instead we use (3.14) that only depends on the player’s
own reserves state x, and reduces to a standard optimal stochastic control problem.
For the exploration control we work with the first order condition as in (3.13). The
HJB equation (3.8) with boundary condition (3.16) is similar to the single-agent
problem in [40]. [40] considered a time-stationary model which reduced the HJB
equation to a first order nonlinear ordinary differential equation and was solved
using a Runge-Kutta scheme. The HJB equation (3.8) differs from [40] in that it
has time-dependence and hence is a genuine PDE.
We employ method of lines to solve the HJB partial differential equation nu-
merically starting with the terminal condition v(T, x) = 0 for all x ∈ [0, Xmax].
Following [16], by discretizing x variable we treat the HJB equation in the time-
space domain [0, T ] × [0, Xmax] as a system of ordinary differential equations in
time variable t. The space derivative of v(t, x) at each space grid point xm is ap-
proximated by a backward difference quotient ∂
∂x
v(t, xm) =
v(t,xm)−v(t,xm−1)
∆x
. The
forward difference term ∆xv(t, xm) is approximated by ∆xv(t, xm) = v(t, xm+d)−
v(t, xm) with d = b δ∆xc so that xm + δ ' xm+d. We solve for v(t, xm) at each
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space grid point xm as an ordinary differential equation in variable t, where we
take v(t, xm−1) and v(t, xm+d) as source terms,
∂
∂t
v(t, xm) = rv(t, xm)− 1
2β1
[(
p(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v(t, xm)
)+]2
− 1
2β2
[
(λ(t)∆xv(t, xm)− κ2)+
]2
, m = 1, ...,M − d.
(3.30)
For the boundary case m = 0, production stops and the equation becomes
∂
∂t
v(t, x0) = rv(t, x0)− 1
2β2
[
(λ(t)∆xv(t, x0)− κ2)+
]2
. (3.31)
For x large enough, saturation level of reserves is reached and no exploration effort
is made, thus the term (λ(t)∆xv(t, x) − κ2)+ vanishes. As in [40, 41], saturation
level xsat of reserves is defined to be xsat(t) := inf{x ≥ 0 : a(t, x) = 0}. For
computational purpose we prescribe the equation to take the following form for
m = M − d+ 1, ...,M ,
∂
∂t
v(t, xm) = rv(t, xm)− 1
2β1
[(
p(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v(t, xm)
)+]2
. (3.32)
Once numerical result is obtained, we need to verify that (λ(t)∆xv(t, xm)−κ2)+ is
indeed zero for m = M−d+1, ...,M . Otherwise, the right limit Xmax of the space
domain should be extended so as to accommodate the condition (λ(t)∆xv(t, xm)−
κ2)
+ = 0 for m = M − d + 1, ...,M . In all the following numerical examples, the
greatest possible saturation level is about x = 70, thus the Xmax = 80 prescribed
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in Table 3.1 is large enough so that the forward delay term (λ(t)∆xv(t, x)− κ2)+
vanishes for Xmax−δ ≤ x ≤ Xmax. We use Matlab fourth order ODE solver ode45
to solve the system (3.30)-(3.32) of ordinary differential equations for {v(t, xm) :
m = 0, 1, ...,M}.
A numerical example of the HJB equation
We now apply the numerical scheme introduced above to solve the HJB equa-
tion (3.8) of a representative player’s game value function with an exogenously
specified price process {p(t), 0 ≤ t ≤ T}.
To prescribe λ(t), observe that intuitively chances of a new discovery should
be proportional to the remaining reserves underground. Assuming the global
exploitable reserves decrease (linearly) in time due to ongoing exploration and
production, we are led to consider a linear link between t and discovery rate λ(t):
λ(t) =
(
1− t/T¯)+ .
The time T¯ can be viewed as global exhaustion of the commodity.
Figure 3.1 shows the computational results of optimal production rate q(t, x)
and exploration effort a(t, x), with a constant exogenous price p(t) = 3,∀t ≤ T .
At each t, production rate q(t, x) is increasing in reserves level x, while exploration
effort a(t, x) is decreasing in x. The monotonicity of q and a in reserves level x is
due to decreasing marginal value of reserves, which is consistent with the result
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in [40, 41]. Both production and exploration rates decrease in t, because the
discovery rate λ(t) per unit exploration effort is decreasing, which gives decreasing
motivation for exploration. As a result the production rate goes down due to
dwindling reserves. The above q(t, x) and a(t, x) for 0 ≤ t ≤ T and 0 ≤ x ≤ Xmax
obtained in the example will be used in the next Section 3.3.2 as input to compute
the evolution of reserves distribution.
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Figure 3.1: Production and exploration controls (q, a) associated with the HJB
equation (3.8) under constant price p(t) = 3 and λ(t) = (1−0.025t)+, 0 ≤ t ≤ T .
Left panel: production rate q(t, x). Right panel: optimized exploration rate
a(t, x).
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3.3.2 Numerical scheme for transport equation
We now assume given controls q(t, x), a(t, x) and take up the evolution of the
reserves distribution. To numerically solve the transport equations of pi(t) and
η(t, x) we approximate the derivative in time by forward difference quotient and
the derivative in space by forward difference quotient
∂
∂t
η(tn, xm) ≈ η(tn+1, xm)− η(tn, xm)
∆t
,
∂
∂x
η(tn, xm) ≈ η(tn, xm+1)− η(tn, xm)
∆x
.
By choosing d = b δ
∆x
c, so that xm − δ ' xm−d we approximate the integral term
in (3.17c) with a Riemann sum
∫ xm
xm−δ
λ(t)a(t, x)η(t, dx) ≈
m∑
j=m−d+1
λ(tn)a(tn, xj) (η(tn, xj)− η(tn, xj−1)) . (3.33)
We start with given initial condition η(t0, xm) = η0(xm), m = 0, . . . ,M , and
pi(t0) = 1− η(t0, x1), and solve forward in time. We also prescribe right boundary
condition η(tn, xM) = 0, n = 0, ..., N with right limit Xmax of space domain
chosen large enough, which is reasonable as reserves distributions η(t, x),∀t in our
numerical examples are compactly supported on a subset of [0, 10] that is included
in [0, Xmax]. The value of η(tn, ·) at x = 0+ is approximated by η(tn, x1), and
thus the boundary probability pi(tn) is approximated by η(tn, x0) − η(tn, x1) ≡
1− η(tn, x1). For η(tn, ·) we solve forward in space, splitting into cases according
to xm ≶ δ, cf. (3.17b)-(3.17c). For 0 < xm ≤ δ we obtain the numerical value of
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η(tn+1, xm) as
η(tn+1, xm) = η(tn, xm) + ∆tq(tn, xm)
η(tn, xm+1)− η(tn, xm)
∆x
−∆t
m∑
j=1
λ(tn)a(tn, xj−1) (η(tn, xj)− η(tn, xj−1)) , (3.34)
where we note that the first term of the finite series in (3.34) is−λ(tn)a(tn, x0)pi(tn),
as we approximate pi(tn) by pi(tn) = η(tn, x0) − η(tn, x1). For xM > xm > δ we
obtain the numerical value of η(tn+1, xm) by
η(tn+1, xm) = η(tn, xm)−∆t
m∑
j=m−d+1
λ(tn)a(tn, xj−1) (η(tn, xj)− η(tn, xj−1))
+ q(tn, xm) (η(tn, xm+1)− η(tn, xm)) ∆t
∆x
. (3.35)
According to (3.17a), we determine the boundary probability pi(tn+1) by pi(tn+1) =
1− η(tn+1, x1).
Illustrating the Evolution of Reserves Distribution
As an example suppose that the initial reserves distribution has a parabolic
initial density m0(x)
m0(x) =
6x(u− x)
u3
, for 0 ≤ x ≤ u,
and m0(x) = 0 otherwise. In the example shown in Figure 3.2, we take u = 10,
cf. m(0, x) on the left panel of the Figure. The evolution of boundary probability
pi(t) = P(Xt = 0) and the density of reserves distribution m(t, x) = − ∂∂xη(t, x)
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are shown in Figure 3.2. Numerically the density function is approximated by a
forward difference quotient m(tn, xm) = −η(tn,xm+1)−η(tn,xm)∆x .
Since discovery rate λ(t) decreases in time, the reserves density m(t, x) shifts
towards zero as time evolves, as shown on the left panel of Figure 3.2. Similarly,
the proportion pi(t) of producers with no remaining reserves increases in t and zero
global reserves are left shortly after discovery becomes impossible inf{t : pi(t) =
0} ' 41, cf. right panel of Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2: Evolution of reserves distribution under the production and ex-
ploration controls (q, a) obtained in Section 3.3.1. The discovery rate is
λ(t) = (1 − 0.025t)+ and unit amount of a discovery is δ = 1. Left panel:
Density of reserves distribution m(t, x) = − ∂
∂x
η(t, x) for several t’s. Right
panel: Proportion of producers with no reserves pi(t) = P(Xt = 0).
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3.3.3 Numerical scheme for the MFG system
We introduce an iterative scheme to solve the system of coupled HJB and
transport equations. Our solution strategy consists of a loop over the following 3
steps. To initialize, we start with a guess of price p(0) that is greater than κ1 for
production rate to be strictly positive.
In Step 1, given the current guess of price p(k), the numerical scheme in Section
3.3.1 is implemented to compute the HJB equation and obtain the optimal pro-
duction q(k) and exploration a(k) rates. Next in Step 2, the production rate q(k) and
exploration rate a(k) obtained from Step 1 are taken into the transport equation
to compute η(k), following the numerical scheme in Section 3.3.2. Once we obtain
the reserves distribution η(k), we can then compute the total production Q(k) by
using Riemann sum to approximate the integration of q(k)(t, x) with respect to
η(k)(t, ·), and then update the price to p(k+1) in Step 3. For each iteration k, if
p(k)(t) is lower than equilibrium price p(t) for all t ∈ [0, T ], the resulting Q(k)(t)
will be lower than the equilibrium Q(t) and the price determined by inverse de-
mand D(−1)(Q(k)(t)) will be higher than the equilibrium price p(t), and vice versa.
Thus in Step 3 we take p(k+1)(t) in the next iteration to be the average of p(k)(t)
and D(−1)(Q(k))(t), so as to make sure that p(k)(t) converges to equilibrium price
p(t) as k increases. This procedure is then looped over the iterations k = 0, 1, . . .
until numerical convergence.
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Step 0. Start with an initial guess p(0)(t) of market price.
Step 1. For iteration k = 0, 1, 2, ..., and given p(k)(t), solve the HJB equation
(3.18) to obtain v(k)(t, x) and the corresponding q(k)(t, x) and a(k)(t, x) as in (3.19)-
(3.20).
Step 2. With the above q(k) and a(k) solve the transport equation to obtain
η(k)(t, x) and pi(k)(t) satisfying (3.17).
Step 3. Update the market price via the new total quantity of production
p(k+1)(t) =
D−1
(
Q(k)(t)
)
+ p(k)(t)
2
with Q(k)(t) = −
∫ ∞
0
q(k)(t, x) η(k)(t, dx).
Repeat Steps 1 - 3 until convergence in the sup-norm defined as ‖·‖∞ :=
sup[0,T ]×[0,Xmax] |·|. Iteration will stop when tolerance of error TolError is satisfied
∥∥v(k+1) − v(k)∥∥∞ < TolError, and ∥∥η(k+1) − η(k)∥∥∞ < TolError. (3.36)
In each iteration k, if v(k)(t, x) is lower than the equilibrium level v(t, x) for all
x ∈ [0, Xmax] with some t fixed, then in the next iteration v(k+1)(t, x) will move up
towards the equilibrium level v(t, x), and vice versa. This is illustrated in Figure
3.3 where v(k)(t, x) is shown starting with initial price process p(0)(t) = 3∀t. As
can be observed v(k)(t, x) converges monotonically in k pointwise at each x with
t = 10 fixed.
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Figure 3.3: Convergence of the numerical scheme in Section 3.3.3. We start
with initial guess p(0)(t) = 3∀t ∈ [0, T ], and discovery rate λ(t) = (1− 0.025t)+.
Game value function v(k)(t, x) converge after k ≥ 4 iterations, with t = 10 fixed.
Illustration
We continue with the running example where the discovery rate is λ(t) =
(1− 0.025t)+ and δ = 1. The solutions obtained in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 can
be viewed as the first iteration k = 0 of the above scheme. After 3 iterations, as
shown in Figure 3.3, we achieve our tolerance of TolError = 10−6 in (3.36).
To analyze the results, we compare them with the non-exploration (NE) case
with zero discovery rate λ(t) = 0. When λ(t) = 0, no exploration effort will be
made a∗(t, x) ≡ 0 as there is no hope to have any discovery. Figure 3.4 shows the
resulting evolution of total production Q(t), total discovery rate A(t), and total
reserves level R(t). Total reserves R(t) decrease as production proceeds; in turn
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decreasing R(t) lowers the total production rate Q(t) and raises market price p(t).
Interestingly we observed a hump shape in t 7→ A(t): initially exploration efforts
rise, then peak and gradually decline. This complex relationship is driven by the
changing exploration success parameter λ(t) (that discourages exploration as time
progresses) and the reserves distribution η(t, x) (which encourages exploration as
reserves tend to get depleted on average).
With exploration (superscript E), we confirm the intuitive relationshipRE(t) ≥
RNE(t) which brings down the marginal value of reserves, and thus boosts pro-
duction, QE(t) ≥ QNE(t)∀t. The right panel of Figure 3.5 quantifies this effect
by plotting the respective η(t, x)’s. Starting with the same initial distribution at
t = 0, the exhausted proportion piNE(t) of the case without exploration is higher
than piE(t). In particular, global exhaustion takes hold much sooner (around
t = 10 for λ ≡ 0 compared to t ' 40 before), cf. left panel of Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of total production Q(t), total reserves R(t), and total
discovery rate A(t) as a function of t. We compare exploration with discovery
rate λ(t) = (1− 0.025t)+, in comparison to zero discovery rate λ(t) = 0.
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of reserves distribution with exploration λ(t) = (1 −
0.025t)+, in comparison with no-exploration λ(t) = 0. Left Panel: Proportion
pi(t) of producers with no reserves at time t. Right panel: Proportion η(t, x) of
players at time t with reserves level greater than x.
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Chapter 4
Stationary Mean Field Games
In Section 3.2 we studied a generic model with time-inhomogeneous discovery
rate λ(t), which would typically be taken to be decreasing in time. When there are
still abundant resources underground, it is reasonable to assume that the discov-
ery rate is time-homogeneous λ(t) = λ, for some λ > 0. Thanks to exploration,
the commodity used up for production can be compensated by new discover-
ies, and thus a stationary level of production and exploration can be obtained.
Specifically, we expect a convergence of the reserves process Xt to a long-run sta-
tionary equilibrium, similar to the behavior of a classical uncontrolled Markov
chain. In the following Section 4.1, we study the stationary MFG model, in which
the reserves level remains invariant due to the counteracting effects of production
and exploration. In Section 4.2, we further study the impact of uncertainty in
95
the regime that the exploration process becomes asymptotically deterministic, so
that discovery of new resources happens at high frequency with small amount of
each discovery.
4.1 Stationary mean field game Nash equilib-
rium
In this section, we aim to search for stationary MFG equilibrium (q˜, a˜, η˜).
Specifically, if the reserves has initial distribution X0 ∼ η˜, and all the players
apply the strategy qt = q˜(x; η˜) and at = a˜(x; η˜), then the reserves process
dXt = −q˜(Xt)1{Xt>0}dt+ δdN˜t (4.1)
has the distribution η˜(·) for all t > 0, that is, the reserves distribution is invariant
in time. We define the stationary objective functional J˜ of a player with current
reserves level x and conditionally on a reserves distribution η˜(·) as
J˜ (q˜, a˜;x, η˜) := E
{∫ ∞
0
[
D−1
(
Q˜(η˜)
)
q˜(Xt)− Cq(q˜(Xt))− Ca(a˜(Xt))
]
e−rtdt
∣∣∣∣ X0 = x} ,
(4.2)
where Q˜(η˜) := − ∫∞
0
q˜(x)η˜(dx) is the stationary aggregate production.
Definition 4.1 (Stationary MFG MNE). Stationary mean field game Nash equi-
librium is a triple (q˜∗, a˜∗, η˜∗) such that for (Xt) from (4.1) the distribution of
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reserves η˜∗ = P(Xt ≥ x)∀t is unchanged under the strategies (q˜∗, a˜∗), and
v˜(x) ≡ J˜ (q˜∗, a˜∗; η˜∗) ≥ J˜ (q, a; η˜∗), ∀(q, a) ∈ A. (4.3)
The following Proposition 4.1 gives the system of stationary HJB and trans-
port equations for v˜, η˜ under a constant discovery rate λ > 0. Intuitively, it is
equivalent to the equations in the previous section after dropping the dependence
on t. Consequently, we pass from PDEs to ordinary differential equations in x.
Proposition 4.1 (Stationary mean field game partial differential equations). The
stationary value function v˜ and upper-cumulative distribution function η˜ satisfy:
rv˜(x) = [−Ca(a˜∗(x)) + a˜∗(x)λ∆xv˜(x)] + [p˜q˜∗(x)− Cq(q˜∗(x))− q˜∗(x)v˜′(x)] , x > 0;
(4.4)
p˜i = 1− η˜(0+);
0 = λa˜∗(0)p˜i − ∫ x
0+
λa˜∗(z)η˜(dz) + q˜∗(x)η˜′(x), 0 < x ≤ δ,
0 = − ∫ x
x−δ λa˜
∗(z)η˜(dz) + q˜∗(x)η˜′(x), x > δ,
(4.5)
where the optimal production and exploration rates (q˜∗, a˜∗) and the equilibrium
price p˜ in stationarity are given by
q˜∗(x) =
1
β1
(
L− Q˜− κ1 − v˜′(x)
)+
,
a˜∗(x) =
1
β2
(λ∆xv˜(x)− κ2)+ ,
p˜ = D−1
(
Q˜
)
= L+
∫ ∞
0
q˜∗(x)η˜(dx), (4.6)
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with Q˜ uniquely determined by the equation
Q˜ = −
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − v˜′(x)− Q˜
)+
η˜(dx).
Similar to [40], the boundary condition v˜(0) is determined by
v˜(0) = sup
a≥0
E
[
e−rτ v˜(δ)−
∫ τ
0
e−rtCa(a)dt
]
= sup
a≥0
aλv˜(δ)− Ca(a)
r + aλ
. (4.7)
In Section 4.1 we will introduce a numerical method to solve for stationary mean
field game equilibrium.
Remark 4.1. If the rate of new discoveries is zero, λ = 0 then from the transport
equation (4.5) we have η˜′(x) = 0 for all x > 0, which implies that there is no
player with positive reserves level in the long run.
Numerical scheme and example for the stationary MFG
For the stationary MFG developed in (4.4)-(4.5) introduced, the iterative
scheme introduced in section 3.3.3 is not directly applicable. The challenge lies
in solving the stationary transport equation (4.5) which requires to specify the
boundary condition p˜i. However, p˜i is implicitly determined by the stationary
transport equation itself, that is, the stationary transport equation (4.5) alone
does not provide enough information about the stationary boundary condition p˜i.
To overcome this issue, we utilize the non-stationary formulation (3.18)-(3.21)
with a large horizon T . The basic idea is that as T →∞, the respective solution
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should converge to the stationary one. A related approach was taken in Chan
and Sircar [17] where the stationary MFG solution was obtained by solving non-
stationary transport equation coupled with stationary HJB equation and taking
the large time limit. Furthermore, it is shown in [9] that a non-stationary MFG
model defined on a time interval [0, T ] with non-local coupling converges to the
corresponding stationary MFG asymptotically as T → ∞. Similar convergence
results are also given in [8] for the case of local coupling. According to [9], for each
t ∈ [0, T ], the solution (v(t, x), η(t, x)) of a non-stationary MFG model converges
in L2-norm to the solution (v˜(x), η˜(x)) of stationary MFG model as T →∞, and
the difference between stationary and non-stationary mean field game equilibrium
solutions, measured by L2-norm, is minimized at t = T/2.
In light of this result, we can obtain an approximate solution of the stationary
MFG MNE by solving the non-stationary equations (3.18) and (3.21) with con-
stant discovery rate λ(t) ≡ λ, employing the same iterative scheme as in Section
3.3.3. Then the solution (v(t, x), η(t, x)) at t = T/2 is taken as approximate so-
lution of the stationary mean field game model (4.4)-(4.5), i.e., v˜(x) ≈ v(T/2, x)
and η˜(x) ≈ η(T/2, x) for all x ∈ [0, Xmax].
A numerical example of mean field game with constant discovery rate λ(t) =
λ ≡ 1 is shown in Figure 4.1. We take T = 50 and the intermediate solution
(v(t, x), η(t, x)) ≈ (v˜(x), η˜(x)) at t = T/2 = 25 as an approximation to the cor-
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responding time-stationary MFG. The stationary reserves density m˜ is approx-
imated as m˜(x) ≈ m(25, x) = ∂
∂x
η(25, x) and shown in the upper left panel of
Figure 4.1. We observe that m˜(x) increases in x for 0 < x ≤ δ where the rate
of discovery is higher than the rate of production; and m˜(x) decreases for x > δ.
The lower panels of Figure 4.1 show the evolution of total production Q(t), total
discovery A(t), and total reserves level R(t), which are defined by (3.22)-(3.24).
Then the stationary total production Q˜, total discovery A˜, and total reserves
level R˜ can be obtained approximately at t = T/2 = 25. The Figure confirms
the link between the stationary solution and the time-dependent one. Namely we
observe a boundary layer for small t (roughly t ∈ [0, 12]) arising from the non-
equilibrium initial distribution η0(dx), and another boundary layer (roughly for
t ∈ [45, 50]) arising from the terminal condition v(T, x) = 0. The latter causes
limt→T R(t) = 0, limt→T A(t) = 0 observed in the plots. At the same time, for
the intermediate t’s all the quantities are effectively time-independent and hence
should be close to the stationary MFG equilibrium solution. In particular, due
to the conservation of reserves Q˜ = A˜ we observe that Q(t) ' A(t) in the range
t ∈ [15, 40].
It is interesting to study the effect of exploration on the equilibrium of the
stationary mean field game. Figure 4.2 shows the effect of discovery rate λ on the
stationary total production Q˜, total discovery rate A˜, and total reserves R˜, all of
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Figure 4.1: MFG solution with a constant λ(t) ≡ λ = 1 to illustrate the
relationship between the time-dependent and stationary solutions. Upper left
panel: Density m(t, x) of reserves distribution. Upper right: Proportion pi(t) of
producers without reserves. Lower left: Total exploration rate A(t) and total
production Q(t). Lower right: Total reserves R(t).
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which have positive relation with λ. Greater λ implies greater chance to make new
reserves discovery with same exploration effort, and thus higher stationary total
production, cf. left panel of Figure 4.2. At low reserves level, exploration effort
a˜(x) increases in λ, as shown in left panel of Figure 4.3. When reserves level is
large enough, as λ increases, exploration effort increases for small λ but decreases
for large λ. When λ is small, e.g. 0 ≤ λ ≤ 0.5 in the right panel of Figure 4.3, it
is relatively hard to obtain new reserves, thus increasing λ motivates exploration
effort and saturation level x˜sat increases in λ. As in [40, 41], the stationary satura-
tion level x˜sat is defined as x˜sat := inf{x ≥ 0 : a˜(x) = 0}. For λ large enough, e.g.
0.5 ≤ λ in the right panel of Figure 4.3, it becomes easy to obtain new reserves
and exploration is not needed at large reserves level, thus saturation level x˜sat de-
creases in λ. As a netted effect, total discovery rate A˜ increases in λ. Conversely,
the stationary proportion p˜i of exhausted producers decreases in λ, as expected
time until next discovery at x = 0 shrinks due to λa˜∗(0) increasing, cf. right panel
of Figure 4.2. When λ is very small, e.g. λ < 0.05 in Figure 4.2, exploration
stops (A˜ = 0) and reserves level becomes zero (R˜ = 0) in stationary equilibrium.
This occurs because when κ2 > 0 and λ is small enough, the expected addition
of value λ∆xv˜(x) is smaller than the cost κ2 and thus no exploration efforts will
be made. Thus, when discoveries are “too difficult”, exploration will cease even
if there are still potential new reserves remaining underground, λ > 0. When
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λ is small, it is hard to obtain reserves, thus increasing λ motivates exploration
effort significantly. As a result, increased discovery makes reserves distribution
more dispersed. The degree of dispersion of reserves distribution, measured by
standard deviation Stdev(X˜) =
√
− ∫∞
0
x2η˜(dx)− (− ∫∞
0
xη˜(dx)
)2
, increases in
λ for small values λ ∈ [0, 4], as shown in the right panel of Figure 4.4. When λ is
large enough, producers do not need too many reserves as they are easy to obtain,
thus probability of having a lot of reserves goes down, though total reserves level
goes up. As a result, reserves distribution becomes more concentrated for discov-
ery rate λ large enough, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4.4 that standard
deviation of reserves distribution decreases in λ for λ > 4.
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Figure 4.2: Stationary MFG solution as a function of discovery rate λ. Left
panel: Total production Q˜. Middle: Stationary reserves R˜; Right: Stationary
proportion P˜ of producers with no reserves.
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saturation level x˜sat = inf{x ≥ 0 : a˜(x) = 0} as a function of λ.
4.2 Fluid limit of exploration process
In this section we study the effect of randomness of exploration process on
equilibrium production and reserves distribution. The stochasticity of the explo-
ration process depends on two factors: the discovery rate λ per unit exploration
effort, and the size δ of each discovery. It is interesting to study the asymptotic
behavior of producers as the game becomes more deterministic. To do so, we
introduce an asymptotic parameter  > 0, rescaling λ := λ/ and δ := δ. As
 ↓ 0, we have the discovery rate λ ↑ ∞ and unit discovery amount δ ↓ 0, which
means that the exploration process becomes more deterministic.
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Figure 4.4: Effect of discovery rate λ on reserves distribution. Left panel: Den-
sity m˜(x) of stationary reserves distribution with different values of λ. Right:
Standard deviation Stdev(X˜) of stationary reserves distribution against discov-
ery rate λ, where Stdev(X˜) =
√
− ∫∞
0
x2η˜(dx)− (− ∫∞
0
xη˜(dx)
)2
.
We aim to study the asymptotic behavior, as  ↓ 0, of the equilibrium pro-
duction and exploration (q˜, a˜) and reserves distribution η˜ associated with the
game value function v˜. For the limiting case  = 0 when the exploration process
is fully deterministic, the non-stationary mean field game equations are given by
(4.8)-(4.9). Intuitively, the difference term ∆xv(t, x) = v(t, x+δ)−v(t, x) becomes
∂
∂x
v0(t, x) in the fluid limit and the integral becomes δa
∗
0(t, x)
∂
∂x
η0(t, x).
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0 =
∂
∂t
v0(t, x)− rv0(t, x) + 1
2β1
[(
p(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v0(t, x)
)+]2
+
1
2β2
[(
λδ
∂
∂x
v0(t, x)− κ2
)+]2
. (4.8)

pi0(t) = 1− η0(t, 0+);
∂
∂t
η0(t, x) = (−λδa∗0(t, x) + q∗0(t, x)) ∂∂xη0(t, x), x > 0,
(4.9)
where the optimal production rate q∗0 and exploration rate a
∗
0 are
q∗0(t, x) = arg max
q≥0
[
p0(t)q(t, x)− Cq(q(t, x))− q(t, x) ∂
∂x
v0(t, x)
]
=
1
β1
(
p0(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v0(t, x)
)+
, (4.10)
a∗0(t, x) = arg max
a≥0
[
−Ca(a(t, x)) + a(t, x)λδ ∂
∂x
v0(t, x)
]
=
1
β2
(
λδ
∂
∂x
v0(t, x)− κ2
)+
. (4.11)
The boundary conditions v0(t, 0) and
∂
∂x
v0(t, 0) are given explicitly by the following
lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1. The boundary conditions v0(t, 0) and
∂
∂x
v0(t, x) satisfy
∂
∂x
v0(t, 0) =
β2(p0(t)− κ1) + β1λδκ2
β1λ2δ2 + β2
; (4.12)
v0(t, 0) =
∫ T
t
[
λδ(p0(s)− κ1)− κ2
β1λ2δ2 + β2
]2
(1 + λ2δ2)e−r(s−t)ds. (4.13)
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Proof. See Appendix A.5.
The following Proposition 4.2 summarizes the stationary MFG in the fluid
limit  = 0.
Proposition 4.2 (Stationary mean field game equilibrium in fluid limit). The
stationary mean field equilibrium in fluid limit( = 0) is summarized as
(i). The stationary reserves distribution is p˜i0 = 1, i.e. all producers choose to
hold no reserves, R˜0 = 0.
(ii). The equilibrium total production Q˜0 and market price in the fluid limit are
given by
Q˜0 =
[(L− κ1)λδ − κ2]+
β2 + (1 + β1)λδ
, p˜0 = L− Q˜0 (4.14)
(iii). The equilibrium exploration control is a˜∗0(x) = 0 ∀x > 0 and
a˜∗0(0) =
1
δλ
q˜∗0(0). (4.15)
The proof of Proposition 4.2 is Appendix A.4 . In the case of fluid limit  = 0,
discovery of new resources happens in a completely deterministic way, thus it is
not necessary to hold reserves for production. Producers starting with positive
reserves will not explore until reserves run out. Once reserves level reaches zero,
equation (4.15) implies that a player without reserves will choose production and
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exploration strategies such that the production rate exactly equals the rate of
reserves increment due to his exploration effort. This explains how zero reserves
can be sustained in equilibrium. Overall, the above Proposition shows that the
stationary equilibrium with deterministic exploration is trivial, i.e. only x = 0
matters and the system of ODEs effectively collapses to algebraic equations linking
Q˜0 and A˜0 to model parameters. This shows that the stochastic model is strictly
more complex than the deterministic one.
Numerical example of a fluid limit model
In Section 4.2 we studied the model where exploration was deterministic. In
this section we present the effect of the introduced parameter  in the regime  ↓ 0.
The iterative scheme in Section 3.3.3 is easily adapted to solve the fluid limit
system (4.8)-(4.9). As in Section 3.3.1, we employ method of lines to numerically
solve the HJB equation. The space derivative of v0(t, x) at each space grid point xm
is approximated by a forward difference quotient ∂
∂x
v0(t, xm) =
v0(t,xm)−v0(t,xm−1)
∆x
.
At each space grid point xm, we represent
∂
∂t
v0(t, xm) in terms of v0(t, xm) and
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∂
∂x
v0(t, xm) with v0(t, xm−1) taken as source term,
∂
∂t
v0(t, xm) = rv0(t, xm)− 1
2β1
[(
p(t)− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v0(t, xm)
)+]2
− 1
2β2
[(
λδ
∂
∂x
v0(t, xm)− κ2
)+]2
, m = 1, 2, ...,M.
(4.16)
We use Matlab fourth-order ODE solver ode45 to solve the system (4.16) of ordi-
nary differential equations for {v(t, xm) : m = 0, 1, ...,M} with boundary condi-
tion v0(t, x0) ≡ v0(t, 0) given by (4.13) and terminal condition v(t, xm) = 0 for all
m = 0, 1, ...,M .
We use forward in time and forward in space scheme to solve the transport
equation (4.9). As in section 3.3.2, we also prescribe right boundary condition
η0(tn, xM) = 0, n = 0, ..., N with right limit Xmax of space domain chosen large
enough, which is reasonable as reserves distribution η0(t, x),∀t in the numerical
example is compactly supported on a subset of [0, 10] that is included in [0, Xmax].
Similar to (3.34), we obtain the numerical value of η0(tn+1, xm) as
η0(tn+1, xm) = η0(tn, xm)
+ ∆t [−λδa0(tn, xm) + q0(tn, xm)] η0(tn, xm+1)− η0(tn, xm)
∆x
,
m = 2, ...,M − 1.
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According to (4.9), we determine the boundary probability pi(tn+1) by pi(tn+1) =
1− η(tn+1, x1), where η(tn+1, x1) is used to approximate the value of η(tn+1, ·) at
x = 0+.
We find that a more deterministic discovery of resources lowers the game value
as well as the marginal value of reserves. As discovery becomes more deterministic,
it is less necessary to hold reserves for production. Thus the stationary reserves
level R˜ decreases as  ↓ 0, as shown in the right panel of Figure 4.5. Deterministic
discovery of resources also boosts total production as shown in left and middle
panels of Figure 4.5, and consequently lowers the price.
Economically, the uncertainty in reserves replenishment forces producers to
hold a buffer of current reserves. This buffer can be reduced as  ↓ 0. In the limit
 = 0, production can be viewed as a perfect just-in-time supply chain: effort
is expended to find an infinitesimal amount of new underground resources which
are immediately extracted and sold for profit. Thus, exploration effort becomes
equivalent to a secondary production cost, the cost of securing the commodity
supply to exactly match the desired production rate. Moreover, the uncertainty
discourages exploration (due to the time-value of money of putting in effort today
for a delayed reward at discovery date τ).
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Figure 4.5: Equilibrium production and reserves level in the regime λ = λ/
and δ = δ for different values of . Left panel: Evolution of total production
Q(t). Middle: Stationary production Q˜ against . Right : Stationary reserves
level R˜ against .
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and future work
5.1 Conclusion
In Chapter 2 we studied the effect of exploration and stochastic demand in
dynamic Cournot games. In the model of [40], players competed in a dynamic
noncooperative game as their reserves of an exhaustible resource depleted, simul-
taneously exploring new reserves. The only stochastic aspect was (Poissonian)
randomness in reserve discoveries, making the overall game to be piecewise de-
terministic. The stochastic demand in our research adds a further feature of
fluctuating market prices, introducing further dynamic aspects into the duopoly.
We modelled this feature through a regime-switching price (inverse demand) func-
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tion, which represented a random environment under which the producers make
strategies of production and exploration.
Stochastic demand creates the possibility of a new (dubbed Type M2) equilib-
rium whereby the exhaustible producer may opportunistically shutdown produc-
tion in hopes of higher profits in the future. This happens when reserves are low
and their shadow marginal cost is high enough. Additionally, the non-monotonic
impact of competition on exploration efforts already observed in [40] continues to
occur in our model and leads to interesting phenomena herein.
In Chapters 3 and 4 we employ mean field game approach to study the produc-
tion and exploration of exhaustible commodities with a large population of pro-
ducers. Among versions of the model we study are: stationary and non-stationary
exploration rates; stochastic and deterministic reserves discovery process. Several
numerical schemes based on finite-difference approaches have been developed to
analyze and illustrate the above models.
It is found that total production and total reserves level increase as discovery
rate increases, as higher discovery rate boosts exploration effort and thus increases
reserves for production. It is also found that when discovery rate is small enough
(not necessarily zero), exploration will stop, because the expected value addition
cannot cover the varying cost of exploration activity.
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We also study the effect of uncertainty in the process of exploration and dis-
covery. Uncertainty forces producers to hold a buffer of current reserves, and the
buffer reduces as uncertainty reduces. It is also found that exploration is dis-
couraged by uncertainty, due to the time-value of investment of putting in effort
today for a delayed reward at a later discovery date. Deterministic exploration and
discovery of resources boost total production and consequently lower the price.
5.2 Future work
A variant of the MFG approach presented in Chapters 3 and 4 would be to con-
sider competition between a single major energy producer and a large population
of minor energy producers. This would correspond for example to the dominant
role played by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in the
crude oil market, with OPEC controlling about 40% of the world’s oil production.
Due to the resulting market power, the minor producers choose production strate-
gies based on the production strategy of OPEC. The corresponding game model
would involve a game value function for the major player, a game value function
for a representative minor producer, and the reserves distribution of minor pro-
ducers. The price is then determined by the aggregate production of the major
plus all minor producers.
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Since the major producer has dominating power to determine price, the mi-
nor producers have to make production decision based on the major producer’s
strategy. Taking into account the full information about the minor producers’
production strategy, the major producer decides his own production quantity in
order to maximize his profit. And then the minor producers choose quantity of
production based on the major producer’s strategy. The major producer and mi-
nor producers realize profit under the equilibrium price determined through the
above decision process.
The mean filed game model with a major player and a group of minor players
consists of three equations: an HJB equation of the game value function of the
major player; an HJB equation of the game value function of a representative
minor player; an equation for the reserves distribution of minor players. The
price, as the mean field term, is a function of the total production that is equal
to the production of the major producer and the total production of all minor
producers.
To numerically solve the system of equations, we can adopt the iterative scheme
in Section 3.3.3. Starting with an initial guess of price, we solve the HJB equa-
tion of a minor representative producer to obtain optimal production strategy of
minor producers. Then we solve the transport equation, and compute the total
production of all minor producers. With the total production of all minor pro-
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ducers obtained, we solve the HJB equation of the major producer and obtain
the optimal production strategy of the major producer. Then we update the
price according to the optimal production strategies of the major producer and
minor producers, and use the updated price for the next iteration until numerical
convergence.
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Appendix A
Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 2.1
Proof. To derive the asymptotic game functions as λ01 → +∞, we set λ01 = 1 .
Without loss of generality, we assume that the asymptotic expansion of vM(x)
with respect to  is
vi = v
0
i + g()v
1
i + o(g()), i = L,H (A.1)
where g()→ 0, as → 0.
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We substitute the vL and vH in the HJB ODEs with their asymptotic expansion
to obtain[
2
3
(
L+ c
2
− (vL)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c− L− (vL)′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆vL(x)− κ)+]γ
+
1

(
v0H(x)− v0L(x)
)
+
1

(
g()[v1H(x)− v1L(x)] + o(g())
)− rvL(x) = 0,
(A.2)
[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− (vH)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − (vH)′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆vH(x)− κ)+]γ
+ λ10
(
v0L(x)− v0H(x)
)
+ g()λ10(v
1
L(x)− v1H(x))− rvH(x) + o(g()) = 0.
(A.3)
We must have that lim→0 vL = lim→0 v

L, i.e. v
0
L = v
0
H =: v˜, otherwise the
term −1(v0H − v0L) will explode as → 0. Making that simplification, multiplying
(A.2) by λ10 and adding (A.3) we obtain
0 = λ10
[
2
3
(
L+ c
2
− (vL)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c− L− (vL)′(x))+
]2
+
[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− (vH)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − (vH)′(x))+
]2
+
λ10
γ
[(λ∆vL(x)− κ)+]γ +
1
γ
[(λ∆vH(x)− κ)+]γ − r (λ10vL(x) + vH(x)) .
(A.4)
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One can now take  → 0 which reduces to a regular perturbation of the fol-
lowing ODE for v˜(x) (note that the first term involving L vanishes):[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− (v˜H)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − (v˜H)′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆v˜H(x)− κ)+]γ − rv˜H(x) = 0,
which matches the solution of an exploration duopoly game studied in [40] with
linear inverse demand pt = H − q1t − q2t .
For the boundary conditions, we re-write (2.5) as
(vH(0)− vL(0))
(
1

)
+ vL(δ)λa

L(0)− Ca(aL(0))− (r + λaL(0)) vL(0) = 0,
(A.5)
(vL(0)− vH(0))λ10 + vH(δ)λaH(0)− Ca(aH(0))− (r + λaH(0)) vH(0) = 0.
(A.6)
We multiply (A.5) by λ10 and add to (A.6) to obtain
λ10 [v

L(δ)λa

L(0)− Ca(aL(0))− (r + λaL(0)) vL(0)]
+ [vH(δ)λa

H(0)− Ca(aH(0))− (r + λaH(0)) vH(0)] = 0.
(A.7)
Letting → 0 removes the first terms and we are left with
v˜(δ)λa˜(0)− Ca(a˜(0))− (r + λa˜(0)) v˜(0) = 0,
which is equivalent to
v˜(0) =
v˜(δ)λa˜(0)− Ca(a˜(0))
(r + λa˜(0))
= sup
a
v˜(δ)λa− Ca(a)
(r + λa)
, (A.8)
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again matching the corresponding boundary condition in the deterministic de-
mand setting.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2.2
Proof. We set λ01 =
bL

, λ10 =
bH

, where bL, bH are some constants, and  > 0 can
be arbitrarily small. The stationary distribution ~pi given by piL =
λ10
λ01+λ10
= bH
bL+bH
,
piH =
bL
bL+bH
is unchanged as → 0.
We consider the asymptotic expansions of vM in terms of :
vi = v
0
i + f()v
1
i + o(f()), i = L,H, (A.9)
where f()→ 0, as → 0. Substituting (A.9) into (2.13) yields[
2
3
(
L+ c
2
− (vL)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c− L− (vL)′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆vL(x)− κ)+]γ
(A.10)
+
bL

(
v0H(x) + f()v
1
H(x)− v0L(x)− f()v1L(x)
)− rvL(x) + o(f()) = 0;[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− (vH)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − (vH)′(x))+
]2
+
1
γ
[(λ∆vH(x)− κ)+]γ
(A.11)
+
bH

(
v0L(x) + f()v
1
L(x)− v0H(x)− f()v1H(x)
)− rvH(x) + o(f()) = 0.
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We must have that lim→0 vL = lim→0 v

L, i.e. v
0
L = v
0
H = v¯, otherwise the
terms bL

(vH − vL) and bH (vL − vH) above would explode as → 0. Indeed, it is
clear that |vL(x)− vH(x)| → 0 as → 0 due to the fast switching of the regimes,
making the initial macroeconomic conditions irrelevant.
Canceling the terms v0L − v0H ≡ 0 in (A.10)-(A.11), multiplying (A.10) by
bH/(bL + bH), (A.11) by bL/(bL + bH), and adding them up we obtain
0 = piL
[
2
3
(
L+ c
2
− (vL)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c− L− (vL)′(x))+
]2
+ piH
[
2
3
(
H + c
2
− (vH)′(x)
)+
− 1
6
(2c−H − (vH)′(x))+
]2
+
piL
γ
[(λ∆vL(x)−κ)+]γ+
piH
γ
[(λ∆vH(x)−κ)+]γ−r (piLvL(x) + piHvH(x))+o(f()).
Note that all the terms involving −1 have cancelled out. Once again plugging in
(A.9) we can now take  → 0 since this just amounts to a regular perturbation;
the result is precisely (2.19).
For the boundary conditions, we re-write the original
vi (0) =
vj(0)(
bi

) + vi (δ)λa

i(0)− Ca(ai(0))
r + bi

+ λai(0)
, i, j = L,H
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as
(vH(0)− vL(0))
(
bL

)
+ vL(δ)λa

L(0)− Ca(aL(0))− (r + λaL(0)) vL(0) = 0,
(A.12)
(vL(0)− vH(0))
(
bH

)
+ vH(δ)λa

H(0)− Ca(aH(0))− (r + λaH(0)) vH(0) = 0.
(A.13)
Once again multiplying (A.12) by bH/(bL + bH) and (A.13) by bL/(bL + bH), and
summing produces
piLv

L(δ)λa

L(0) + piHv

H(δ)λa

H(0)− piLCa(aL(0))− piHCa(aH(0))
− piL (r + λaL(0)) vL(0)− piH (r + λaH(0)) vH(0) = 0. (A.14)
As → 0, aM(0) = [(λ∆vM(0)−κ)+]γ−1 → [(λ∆v¯(0)−κ)+]γ−1 = a¯(0), and we
find v¯(δ)λa¯(0)−Ca(a¯(0))−(r + λa¯(0)) v¯(0) = 0, which is equivalent to (2.20).
A.3 Proof of Proposition 3.1
Proof. In any time interval (0, T ), let h(t, x) ∈ C∞c ((0, T )×R+) be a test function
that is supported in (0, T )×R+. Using Itoˆ formula for jump processes, we have
0 = h(T,XT )− h(0, X0)
=
∫ T
0
∂
∂t
h(t,Xt)− q(t,Xt) ∂
∂x
h(s,Xt)dt+
∫ T
0
h(t,Xt)− h(t−, Xt−)dNt,
(A.15)
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where the first equality is due to the fact that h(·, ·) has support in (0, T ) × R+
so that h(T,XT ) = h(0, X0) = 0. Apply expectation operator E [·] to equation
(A.15)
0 = E [h(T,XT )− h(0, X0)]
= E
[∫ T
0
∂
∂t
h(t,Xt)− q(t,Xt) ∂
∂y
h(t,Xt)dt+
∫ T
0
h(t,Xt)− h(t−, Xt−)dNt
]
= −
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
∂
∂t
h(t, x)
∂
∂x
η(t, x)dtdx+
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
q(t, x)
∂
∂x
h(t, x)
∂
∂x
η(t, x)dtdx
−
∫ ∞
δ
∫ T
0
(h(t, x)− h(t, x− δ))λ(t)a(t, x− δ) ∂
∂x
η(t, x− δ)dtdx
+
∫ T
0
h(t, δ)λ(t)a(t, 0)pi(t)dt =: I1 + I2 + I3 + I4. (A.16)
By integration-by-parts and the fact that h(t, x) has compact support in
(0, T ) × R+, the first term on the right hand side of the last equality of (A.16)
equals to
I1 =
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
η(t, x)
∂
∂t
∂
∂x
h(t, x)dtdx = −
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
∂
∂x
h(t, x)
∂
∂t
η(t, x)dtdx.
(A.17)
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By defining F (t, x) :=
∫ x
0
λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz), x > 0, the third term on the right
hand side of the last equality of (A.16) can be written as
I3 = −
∫ ∞
δ
∫ T
0
h(t, x)
∂
∂x
F (t, x− δ)dtdx+
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
h(t, x)
∂
∂x
F (t, x)dt dx
=
∫ ∞
δ
∫ T
0
F (t, x− δ) ∂
∂x
h(t, x)dtdx−
∫ ∞
0
∫ T
0
F (t, x)
∂
∂x
h(t, x)dt
=
∫ ∞
δ
∫ T
0
(F (t, x)− F (t, x− δ)) ∂
∂x
h(t, x)dtdx−
∫ δ
0
∫ T
0
F (t, x)
∂
∂x
h(t, x)dt dx.
(A.18)
The fourth term on the right hand side of the last equality of (A.16) can be
written as
I4 =
∫ T
0
(∫ δ
0
∂
∂x
h(t, x)dx
)
λ(t)a(t, 0)pi(t)dt
=
∫ δ
0
∫ T
0
λ(t)a(t, 0)pi(t)
∂
∂x
h(t, x)dtdx. (A.19)
By substituting (A.17)- (A.19) into equation (A.16), we obtain
0 = −
∫ δ
0
∫ T
0
∂
∂x
h(t, x)
[
∂
∂t
η(t, x)− q(t, x) ∂
∂x
η(t, x) +
∫ x
0+
λa(t, z)η(t, dz)
+ λ(t)a(t, x)pi(t)
]
dtdx
−
∫ ∞
δ
∫ T
0
∂
∂x
h(t, x)
[
∂
∂t
η(t, x)− q(t, x) ∂
∂x
η(t, x) +
∫ x
x−δ
λa(t, z)η(t, dz)
]
dtdx,
(A.20)
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which is true for any test function h(t, x) ∈ C∞c ((0, T )×R+). According to the
first term of the right hand side of (A.20), we have
0 =
∂
∂t
η(t, x)− q(t, x) ∂
∂x
η(t, x) +
∫ x
0+
λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz) + λ(t)a(t, x)pi(t), 0 < x < δ.
(A.21)
According to the second term of the right hand side of (A.20), we have
0 =
∂
∂t
η(t, x)− q(t, x) ∂
∂x
η(t, x) +
∫ x
x−δ
λ(t)a(t, z)η(t, dz), x > δ. (A.22)
Since Xt has point mass accumulated at x = 0 so that η(t, 0) 6= limx→0+ η(t, x),
we determine the boundary probability pi(t) by the relation
pi(t) = lim
x→0+
(1− η(t, x)) = 1− η(t, 0+). (A.23)
The three pieces of equations (A.21) - (A.23) constitute the transport equation
of reserves distribution given in Proposition 3.1.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 4.2
About the mean field game equilibrium in fluid limit, we need to understand
the partial differential equations associated with the mean field game model in
fluid limit, which are summarized in the following lemmas A.1 and A.2.
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Lemma A.1. The limiting game value function v0 and reserves distribution func-
tion (p˜i0, η˜0) satisfy the following system of mean field game equations (A.24) -
(A.25).
rv˜0(x) = [(p˜0 − v˜′0(x)) q˜∗0(x)− Cq(q˜∗0(x))] + [−Ca(a˜∗0(x)) + a˜∗0(x)λδv˜′0(x)] , 0 ≤ x,
(A.24)

0 = −λδa˜∗0(0)p˜i0 − q˜∗0(0+)η˜′0(0+),
0 = (−λδa˜∗0(x) + q˜∗0(x)) η˜′0(x), x > 0,
(A.25)
where the optimal production rate q˜∗0 and exploration rate a˜
∗
0 are given by
q˜∗0(x) =
1
β1
(
L− Q˜0 − κ1 − v˜′0(x)
)+
,
a˜∗0(x) =
1
β2
(λδv˜′0(x)− κ2)+ , (A.26)
with Q˜0 uniquely determined by the equation
Q˜0 = −
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − v˜′0(x)− Q˜0
)+
η˜0(dx),
and the equilibrium price is
p˜0 = L+
∫ ∞
0
q˜∗0(z)η˜0(dz). (A.27)
Proof. To obtain the HJB equation (A.24) of limiting game value function v˜0(x)
and the associated optimal production controls (A.26), we let  → 0, i.e. δ ↓ 0
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and λ/ ↑ ∞ in the HJB equation (3.8) and the associated optimal production
and exploration controls (3.9)-(3.10)
a˜∗0(x) = lim
→0
a˜∗(x) = lim
→0
1
β2
[λ (v˜(x+ δ)− v˜(x))− κ2]+
= lim
→0
1
β2
[
λ

(v˜(x+ δ)− v˜(x))− κ2
]+
=
1
β2
(λδv˜′0(x)− κ2)+ ,
q˜∗0(x) = lim
→0
q˜∗ (x) = lim
→0
1
β1
(
L− Q˜ − κ1 − v˜′(x)
)+
=
1
β1
(
L− Q˜0 − κ1 − v˜′0(x)
)+
,
where
Q˜0 = lim
→0
Q˜ = lim
→0
−
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v˜(x)− Q˜
)+
η˜(dx)
= −
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − ∂
∂x
v˜0(x)− Q˜0
)+
η˜0(dx).
Similarly, we send  ↓ 0 to obtain the fluid limit transport equation (A.25).
Note that as  ↓ 0 the integral term ∫ x
x−δ λa˜(z)η˜(dz) in the third case δ < x of
(3.21c) converges to
lim
→0
∫ x
x−δ
λa˜(z)η˜(dz) = lim
→0
∫ x
x−δ
λ

a˜(z)η˜(dz) = λa˜0(x)
∂
∂x
η˜0(x).
Lemma A.2 states production and exploration strategies with no reserves x =
0.
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Lemma A.2 (Equilibrium production and exploration of fluid limit on boundary
x = 0). The equilibrium production and exploration rates in fluid limit on the
boundary x = 0 satisfy (4.15)
Proof. On the boundary x = 0 where there is no reserves, we must have δλa˜∗0(0) ≥
q˜∗0(0) ≥ 0, i.e., the rate of reserves additions must be greater than or equal to
production rate. If a∗0(0) = 0, it follows directly that q
∗
0(0) = λδa
∗
0(0) = 0.
Now we consider the case that a∗0(0) > 0. Since q˜
∗
0(x) ≥ 0 is increasing and
a˜∗0(x) is decreasing to 0 as x increases, we must have some point x
∗ ≥ 0 such that
q∗0(x
∗) = λδa∗0(x
∗). Note that once reserves process Xt reaches the level x∗, it will
remain unchanged since production rate q˜∗0(x
∗) is balanced by the rate of reserves
increment λδv˜∗0(x
∗) at Xt = x∗.
Suppose by contradiction that x∗ > 0, then we have
v˜0(x
∗) =
∫ ∞
0
[p˜0q˜
∗
0(Xt)− Cq(q˜∗0(Xt))− Ca(a˜∗0(Xt))] e−rtdt
∣∣∣
X0=x∗
=
∫ ∞
0
[p˜0q˜
∗
0(x
∗)− Cq(q˜∗0(x∗))− Ca(a˜∗0(x∗))] e−rtdt
∣∣∣
X0=x∗
=
∫ ∞
0
[p˜0q˜
∗
0(x
∗)− Cq(q˜∗0(x∗))− Ca(a˜∗0(x∗))] e−rtdt
∣∣∣
X0=0
≤ v˜0(0),
where the third equality is due to q∗0(x
∗) = λδa∗0(x
∗) so that the initial reserves
level X0 does not influence the game value, and the last inequality is due to that
the constant production rate q˜∗0(x
∗) and exploration rate a˜∗0(x
∗) are not necessarily
optimal at Xt = 0.
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Letting τ := inf
{
t ≥ 0 : ∫ t
0
q∗0(0)ds = x
∗
}
with τ = ∞ if ∫ t
0
q∗0(0)ds < x
∗ for
all t ≥ 0, we have
v˜0(x
∗) ≥
∫ τ
0
[p˜0q
∗
0(0)− Cq(q∗0(0))] e−rtdt+ e−rτ v˜0(0)
∣∣∣
X0=x∗
>
∫ τ
0
[p˜0q
∗
0(0)− Cq(q∗0(0))− Ca(a∗0(0))] e−rtdt+ e−rτ v˜0(0)
∣∣∣
X0=x∗
=
∫ τ
0
[p˜0q
∗
0(0)− Cq(q∗0(0))− Ca(a∗0(0))] e−rtdt+ e−rτ v˜0(0)
∣∣∣
X0=0
= v˜0(0),
where the strict inequality “ > ” is due to the assumption that a∗0(0) > 0.
The above two inequalities v˜0(0) ≥ v˜0(x∗) and v˜0(x∗) > v˜0(0) contradict each
other. Then we have that x∗ = 0, and thus q˜∗0(0) = λδa˜
∗
0(0).
With the Lemmas A.1 and A.2, we are ready to prove Proposition 4.2.
Proof of proposition 4.2. (i). Since q˜∗0(x) > 0 and a˜
∗
0(x) = 0 for x > 0, we have
η˜′0(x) = 0 for x > 0, according to the equation (A.25) in the interior x > 0. Since
there is not probability density for x > 0, we have boundary probability equal to
1, i.e. p˜i0 = 1.
(ii). According to the conclusion (i) that p˜i0 = 1, we can determine Q˜0 by
Q˜0 = −
∫ ∞
0
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − v˜′0(x)− Q˜0
)+
η˜0(dx)
=
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − v˜′0(0)− Q˜0
)+
,
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which gives Q˜0 =
1
1+β1
(L− κ1 − v˜′0(0))+ . According to (A.26) and the result
Q˜0 =
1
1+β1
(L− κ1 − v˜′0(0))+, the equilibrium production rate at x = 0 is
q˜∗0(0) =
1
β1
(
L− κ1 − v˜′0(0)− Q˜0
)+
=
1
β1
[
L− κ1 − v˜′0(0)−
1
1 + β1
(L− κ1 − v˜′0(0))+
]+
=
1
1 + β1
(L− κ1 − v˜′0(0))+ . (A.28)
By substituting production rate (A.28) and exploration effort (A.26) with x =
0 into the equation q˜∗0(0) = λδa˜
∗
0(0) and solving for v˜
′
0(0), we obtain
v˜′0(0) =
(L− κ1)β2 + κ1(1 + β1)
β2 + (1 + β1)λδ
. (A.29)
Then by substituting the above v˜′0(0) into (A.28) we have
q˜∗0(0) =
[(L− κ1)λδ − κ2]+
β2 + (1 + β1)λδ
.
The above q˜∗0(0) together with the conclusion (i) gives equilibrium total production
Q˜0 = −
∫ ∞
0
q˜∗0(x)η˜0(dx) = p˜i0q˜
∗
0(0) =
[(L− κ1)λδ − κ2]+
β2 + (1 + β1)λδ
.
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A.5 Proof of Lemma 4.1
Proof. Similar to Lemma A.2, at x = 0 we have
q∗0(t, 0) = λδa
∗
0(t, 0). (A.30)
By substituting (4.10)-(4.11) into (A.30), we obtain the boundary condition ∂
∂x
v0(t, 0),
∂
∂x
v0(t, 0) =
β2(p0(t)− κ1) + β1λδκ2
β1λ2δ2 + β2
.
Substituting (4.12) into (4.10)-(4.11), we obtain a∗0(t, 0) and q
∗
0(t, 0) in explicit
form
a∗0(t, 0) =
λδ(p0(t)− κ1)− κ2
β1λ2δ2 + β2
, (A.31)
q∗0(t, 0) =
λ2δ2(p0(t)− κ1)− λδκ2
β1λ2δ2 + β2
. (A.32)
By substituting (4.12), (A.31), and (A.32) into the HJB equation (4.8), we
obtain the following linear first-order differential equation for v0(·, 0):
0 =
∂
∂t
v0(t, 0)− rv0(t, 0) + 1
2
[
(a∗0(t, 0))
2 + (q∗0(t, 0))
2
]
, 0 < x, 0 ≤ t < T,
which admits an explicit solution
v0(t, 0) = v0(T, 0)e
−r(T−t) +
∫ T
t
1
2
[
(a∗0(s, 0))
2 + (q∗0(s, 0))
2
]
e−r(s−t)ds
that matches (4.13) since v0(T, 0) = 0.
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